The Human Question

Both of them are basically equally well-versed in science, although they may disagree about the sort of controversies that competent scientists may disagree over. One of them is firmly convinced that all humans are equal in the sense in which a modern member of a democratic society understands "equal." The other denies this claim and affirms instead a kind of Nietzschean view of human nature. What is the basis for the difference in their convictions about human nature? Whatever it is, it is not a scientific basis.

Only humans desire luxury, relish, i.e., the sensory good as good.

The above description by Aquinas of the object of the highest perceptive power offers plenty of possible comparisons with Alva Noe's theory of perception as being inherently actional. Also, the action/passion talk can be understood in the following way. When I perceive a menacing dog and feel fear, I don't piece together the behavior/feelings of the dog on one hand and of myself on the other. Rather I perceive the threateningme/mybeingthreatened in one act, an act that at the same time relates to appetite in a similar manner. More later.

In his CUA lecture in honor of Fr. Sokolowski, Richard Cobb-Stevens notes how Soko completes Husserl's account of idealization in geometry by pointing out how in geometry, we measure the sides of a figure against itself. That is, instead of taking a ruler as a unit of measure, we measure the different sides of the figure against each other, using one as a unit of measure. This sort of bending of a whole upon itself can be done in geometry but not with real figures. This kinda reminds me of how, when we think of our own happiness or fulfillment, we think about ourselves in a manner (only very loosely) analogous to the above example of geometry. There is a kind of bending of a whole upon itself. Ditto with our awareness of ourselves as bearers and conveyers of truth. It occurs to me, furthermore, that Aquinas's talk of a reflexio involved in judgment is not of some purely spiritual part of us that, because of its angel-like simplicity, its lack of parts, is able to reflect up...

Our bodily movement is expressive because it is not tied concerned only about the here and now.

The less relevant a claim is to our immediate survival, the more reliably true it can be. That 2+3=5 always and everywhere is never relevant to our immediate survival; whereas that these (two) plus those (three) equal five may well be relevant on occasion, yet the former is more reliably true than the latter.

In his Briefer history of time, he states the two following errors: 1. That up until the time of Columbus it was commonly believed that the earth was flat. Well, if by commonly he means other than the educated class, well, maybe so. But even in the 13th century Thomas Aquinas begins the Summa theologiae by mentioning in an offhand way that we know the earth is round thanks to principles of geometry. 2. That it was Church doctrine for centuries that the earth is the center of the universe. Uh, I know of no such doctrine.

I just learned that in my previous posts I got physicalism/supervenience wrong. Correct understanding: supervenience is the claim that a cognitive act is realizable in different instances, and in different kinds of matter. Physicalism is the denial that there is anything other than a materially realized version of consciousness.

Noe points out that the question, "How do you know that you aren't a brain in a vat?" has been used in order to undercut our tendency to take for granted that we have an immediate experience of and interaction with our environment. The expected answer, "I don't know," is supposed to lead us to conclude that our brain is directly aware only of internally produced representations while our body is a kind of vat that houses, nourishes, stimulates and responds to the brain. For if it could be a brain in a vat, then one two different stimuli may cause the same cognitive act; in which case it would follow that this cognitive act is not intrinsically ordered toward either of the possible causes. The most appropriate reply would be to show how representationalism runs into problems, regardless of any concern about brains, vats, and the like. But apart from those types of replies I might also argue that merely not knowing with 2+2=4 certainty that one's everyd...

He compares the meaning of words to the value of currency. Words that fall out of use can no longer be used meaningfully in conversation just like coins belonging to a currency no longer in use. This comparison underscores a point that he credits to Putnam: that we are able to use language meaningfully in part because we belong to a community of language users, including those who, perhaps unlike us, know how to apply the terms correctly. For example, says Noe, he can speak meaningfully about the difference between two kinds of trees (elms vs. oaks) even though he himself cannot distinguish one from the other.

A question for those who regard the operation of the brain as computer-like, as calculative: When I throw a ball in the air, it travels in a parabolic path: am I to say that the ball and earth combine to calculate a parabola? If the answer is "no," because this is just a natural process that happens to form a parabola, then why assume that neural processes are anything more than a more complicated version of the same? If the answer is "yes," then isn't every process a calculation, so that there is nothing special about calculation characterizing neuronal activity, and either everything is conscious in some manner OR simply being a calculation does not suffice to characterize a process as cognitive.

"We bark at our children" to get them to school on time.

When we judge, we don't think about our act of judging, at least not in the way that we think speculatively about an object.

The proposal that Noe rejects is that we start with an individualistic grasp the features of our environment, and then use this as the basis for INFERRING the existence of other, hidden selves. The theory of mind is such an inference. The basis for this understanding of mind is that children around three make a transition from failing to passing the false belief test. The explanation commonly given for this transition is that in order to pass this test we must first acquire a theory of mind. He rejects this explanation. We initially fail this test, NOT because we lack a"theory of mind," but because we initially lack the ability to distinguish our own feelings from those of others. Prior to passing the false belief test, we are already comindful, coaffective and cooperative with another. To illustrate this claim he first points out that the "other" at this phase is typically the mother: as a child we feel loved by her; if she withdraws her affectionate gaze...

He points out that a patient in so-called PVS (permanent vegetative state) has markedly low global brain metabolism (like that of a person in slow wave sleep, or under general anesthesia). But what is remarkable is the fact that in the rare case in which such a patient recovers consciousness, they still show a reduced brain metabolism. In other words, a low brain metabolism is not sufficient to demonstrate PVS.

Out of Our Heads is a terrific book that thoroughly undermines the notion that our brain in some way forms a representation of the world. It does that by a kind of "enactive holism." First of all by regarding cognition as part of a whole--that whole being our interaction with our environment. From this vantage, one can see brain activity as part of the individual's interactivity with her or his environment. One no longer regards the brain in a homuncular manner, as a crane driver that directs and uses our body. The body no longer seems like an living vat that holds the brain while serving as a medium for transmitting messages to and fro. By avoiding a brain/rest-of the-body dualism, one also undercuts the need to posit representations within the brain. Rather, the brain is the point at which our interactions become focused and interrelated. Noe's holistic understanding of the human organism can account for the plasticity of the brain and may perhaps dissolve ...

That is, cognitive scientists note that an area that becomes activated when we recognize a familiar face, an area not found in other animals, and say that this area (fusiform face area) is for facial recognition. Noe points out that this area also becomes activated when specialists are looking at their objects of expertise. Score one for the plasticity of the brain.

It seems that Paley was a utilitarian (sez Copleston) much like J S Mill, except that the former was a theist. Pleasure/pain are the measures of happiness. Non-sequitur move from my feeling like pursuing my happiness to my obligation to seek the greater happiness of all. Obligation as coercian (Austin?). A worthy project: to compare the klunkiness of this very instrumentalist ethics with the inner teleology of Aristotle, and then to draw an analogy between this comparison and Paley's use of teleology in the service of natural theology and Aquinas's 5th way. My point: Aquinas's way as superior to Paley's design argument as is Aristotle's ethics of human flourishing is to Paley's klunky utilitariansim.

Actually, in The Faith of a Physicist, he lists four properties of modern physics brought up by Barbour. The first is the developmental nature of the universe, the second is the intertwining of chance and law; and the third is wholeness and emergence. The footnote lists other works that discuss these same properties (the last two have to do with biology, which is what I'm interested in): Bartholemew 1984 God of Chance Polkinghorne 1986 One World Polkinghorne 1988 Science and Creation Prigogine 1980 From Being to Becoming Prigogine and Stengers 1984 Order out of Chaos Peacocke 1979 Creation and the World of Science Peacocke 1986 God and the New Biology Must look into the last two...

One interesting point of departure for the study of human nature is our ability to know (or suppose that we know) laws of nature. For quite a while these laws have been formulated in mathematical and geometric terms. But math and geometry involve a kind of awareness of the infinite: the infinities that pertain to math and geometry, that is. But what kind of awareness is that? Is it simply a combination of NOT plus FINITE? But how could that mean anything if finite things are all we know? There is some sort of transcendence of experience going on here. Or rather, a transcendence of all possible experience. At this point it seems to be a good idea to reread the Phaedo.