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Howlers by Michael Shermer

1. When arguing against the anthropic principle, he accuses its adherents (quoting Dawkins) to carbon chauvinism.  That is, not being open to the possible that there exist other, non-carbon-based life forms.  But the anthropic principle does not pretend to establish that only one kind of life exists: it simply establishes that any form of life would be impossible if not for the fine tuning of the universe.  This argument by Shermer is a non-sequitur.

2. He argues against the uniqueness of this world, saying there may be multiverses, etc. Well, where does he think the burden of proof lies regarding this controversy?  Does he place the same light burden of proof on those who say what he wants to hear?

3. He points out that humans are not the center because there may be other rational organisms.  Okay, so the universe is not homosapiocentric: is that a big deal?  For the purposes of theism, it would be very sufficient if--at some future date--an even more robust version of the so-called anthropic principle were seen to demonstrate that the universe is fine tuned so that rational beings of one sort or another (or both) can develop.  Let's call that the logocentric priciple.  In other words, ETIs are not an embarrassment to the theistic thesis that nature points to God.

4. He calls the inference to design subjective because lacks an algorithm.  He may well be correct, but how about a little explanation of why the inference to NO design is not subjective?  Does it have an algorithm?


5. He speculates that early mini wings (which were not able to lift the bearer) were radiators.  Really?  sounds so very far-fetched to me!

6. He points out that a scientist has demonstrated, by looking at 100 possible universes, that half of them would last 1 billion years, which is long enough for life to develop because stars could develop requisite chemicals.  Yeah, but enough for a life like ours to develop?  With rational animals?

The last half hour of listening to the audioversion of his book is chock full of howlers,

Comments

Unknown said…
Wow, I have quite a bit to catch up on.

Michael Shermer strikes me as a charlatan. His Skeptics Society meets at Caltech, and everyone there finds them an annoyance. They reserve a meeting hall so they can advertise Michael Shermer as someone who "gives talks at Caltech". Most Skeptics Society members are baby-boomer non-scientists who were disenfranchised by hippies, alternative medicine, California, etc. Shermer himself has a PhD in the history of science. This is a field I respect dearly, but he has no authority to explain multiverses, etc.
Leo White said…
I have boatloads of comments about Mr. Shermer, but I'll say for the moment, that his worst arguments are.... howlers (pretty bad and probably mere froth or rhetoric), but the concessions he makes to his opponents are.... gracious. He opens the door just a crack to human spirit, to there being more to reality than can be quantified. But of course, that's half of the time. The other half of the time he's busy talking the positivist talk (i.e., science knows all that's real or worth knowing). More to come. He is helpful because his arguments are clear, even though they may be inconsistent with each other.

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