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The Human Question

Hi Leo,

I just red the article of Dembski. I think that I understand the position. The idea of him is that it is posible to afirm as a scientific hypothesis that nature have signs of "intelligent design". So, he doen't afirm that God is the gap that we don't understand but that there are things in nature that where the hypothesis of someone who guide the process is reasonable. I found interesting the argument of complexity, basicly, it says that there are certain systems where it is difficult to see how it evolve step by step because if you remove part of the system it doesn't work at all. I thing that this kind of argument that challenge the simple evolution theory are very interesting. I agree with the fact that it is important to recognize that there are many thing that we don't understand of how living beings arrive to be like they are and that this leave the space for a direct action of God.
However, I think that it is not reasonable to say that this probe the action of God in nature. This is something that we don't know and before doing this affirmation it is necesary to see clearly the facts.

My perception is that Dembski is afraid of evolution because he think that it removes the posiblity of God action in the creation of human being. He think that kids lost their faith because the observation of reallity don't demostrate God existence. I disagree with that. God action could have been much more sublte. Why does he need to act in a particular way?. I agree with the fact that there is an educational problem.I also suffered it!. But the problem is to learn to use reason in a correct way and this means to don't impose our ideas but to recognize what is real. I really think that the point is to be amaze for the what is the human being. This is a fact of our experience, something that is clear and that the positivism make us forget. I think that this is the point of the battle.

I know a scientist that was struck for the fact that many , many conditions are requiere for the existence of life in the earth (constants that caracterize nuclear reactions in the starts, temperature of the universe, speed of the big bang, etc...). So, one can reasonable think that everything was put in order for us to appear. If one is amaze for what is man, one is open to a purpose of reallity, an ultimatly purpose should exist. However, I think that we can not put conditions, only to recognize facts.

Alfredo


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