The Human Question

In order for there to be science, the same proposition must be known to have been first proposed, later tested, and finally confirmed/or/rejected. In order for these propositions to be recognized as having been the subject of scientific reasoning, they must have been compared by one and the same person. In other words, I can't know know that I am confirming a hypothesis unless I knew it as an initial hypothesis, then as object of experimental testing and finally as an explanation that has been confirmed or denied. In order for the same person to compare the same proposition at different times, the he or she must keep their identity through time. But if reductive materialism were true, then identity through time would be an illusion. In fact, there would be no such thing as even a momentary identity, for the self would be an illusion. But in such case, there would be no such one to compare the initial hypothesis with its confirming evidence. Nor would there be such a thing ...

In a discussion on Unbelievable?, she stated that there is no such thing as a self: just a collection of cells or atoms (so said she in a friendly debate with Charles Foster). She also let it be known that she belongs to a humanist society (don't know the exact name). My thought on that: it seems rather hard to be a humanist when you don't believe that human beings really exist. Further point: how can we possess mathematical and scientific truths if these truths themselves have an identity and we don't? Is there one neuron that possesses one truth and another that possesses another? Do they share truths with each other? Or does one neuron possess one part of one truth and another neuron possess another part of the other truth? And if many neurons somehow work together to possess a truth and the neurons themselves constantly undergo change, how is it that the truth itself doesn't change slightly? She criticizes the notion that there is an individual within us...