The Human Question

1. recognize that reality is, in a sense, wonderful.  And avoid deflating descriptions of that which fills you with wonder (example of such a description would be to describe culture in a manner that fails to take into account the use of symbols). 2. seek to understand 1 without resorting to the fantastic or fanciful. 3. be open to the possibility that reality is greater than you can imagine (in other words, openness to mystery).

Michael Shermer first criticizes the ID/creationist crowd for committing the fallacy of false dilemma (although he doesn't use that name exactly), and THEN he asks us to chose between methodological naturalism and methodological supernaturalism.

This needs a catchy name--badly.  Also, maybe this is more accurately called an improvement on methodological naturalism.  But here goes (parsimony is #2 in the following list): 1. Conservation of wonder:  When describing the explanandum, don't make it sound less interesting than it really is.  For example, don't describe a sonnet as a meaningful combination of letters: it's more than that.   2. Prefer the familiar to the exotic.  When explaining, strive to come up with explanations that rely on analogies with what is more familiar... when doing so is adequate to the task.  In other words, assign the types of properties associated with quarks only as a kind of last resort. 3. Distinguish rather than separate.  Look for how two things are different aspects of the same whole.  As in electo/magnetism.  4. Identify the limits of the applicability of your analogies:  Every analogy limps if you make it walk far enough.  Th...

Scientific inquiry, says Eugenia Scott (and plenty of others), requires a frame of mind, called "methodological naturalism," i.e., looking only for natural causes. Certainly, someone who wants to do science must look for natural rather than super-natural causes. But time has shown that many who are initiated into methodological naturalism slide into the conviction that only natural causes exist. The truth of the latter conviction, however, is neither evident nor demonstrable, and relying upon an uncertain assumption goes against rationality. Nor is it necessary to make such a presupposition in order to engage in good scientific work. I propose an addendum to the description of the frame of mind for one engaged in the natural sciences: yes, look for natural explanations when doing science, but leave open the question of whether or not natural explanations suffice to explain everything. One who accepts the just-mentioned addendum will avoid saying whether a part or the...