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methodological naturalism

Scientific inquiry, says Eugenia Scott (and plenty of others), requires a frame of mind, called "methodological naturalism," i.e., looking only for natural causes. Certainly, someone who wants to do science must look for natural rather than super-natural causes. But time has shown that many who are initiated into methodological naturalism slide into the conviction that only natural causes exist. The truth of the latter conviction, however, is neither evident nor demonstrable, and relying upon an uncertain assumption goes against rationality. Nor is it necessary to make such a presupposition in order to engage in good scientific work.

I propose an addendum to the description of the frame of mind for one engaged in the natural sciences: yes, look for natural explanations when doing science, but leave open the question of whether or not natural explanations suffice to explain everything. One who accepts the just-mentioned addendum will avoid saying whether a part or the whole of nature requires a supernatural cause. Thus, when faced with something that seems to have no plausible physical explanation, this person will say something like the following: "I can say is that no presently- known natural cause can plausibly explain this event, and I don't expect to find one, given the laws of nature as I understand them. But I must add that science leaves open the possibility that a plausible natural explanation may some day be discovered."

The same person who utters those words expressing a suspension of scientific judgment about an event might turn around and affirm, on the basis of considerations going beyond science, that he or she believes that God (and not just an unusual natural cause--not even a personal being with supra-human powers) is the cause of the event in question. Although this opinion in favor of the supernatural will not be a scientific one, it will nevertheless be entirely consistent with scientific principles. For example, one who learns that the sun has apparently spun around in the presence of 100,000 people precisely at the time and place predicted by a poor shepherd girl quite reasonably decide that this event has been brought about by God in order to give credence to the shepherd's accompanying message. This act of faith will be consistent with a scientific attitude as long as she or he doesn't claim to have proven scientifically that God has wrought this effect.

The proposed description of the scientific attitude needs a name. How about "methodologically silent openness" to the supernatural?

While we're at it, let's propose as a name for the other frame of mind: how about "naturalistic eschatology" for those who have made it their faith that science will eventually explain every thing that otherwise seems to have a supernatural cause, or "naturalistic dogmatism" for those who deny the very existence of the supernatural?

Comments

Leo White said…
"methodological openness" sounds better

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