Skip to main content

methodological naturalism

Scientific inquiry, says Eugenia Scott (and plenty of others), requires a frame of mind, called "methodological naturalism," i.e., looking only for natural causes. Certainly, someone who wants to do science must look for natural rather than super-natural causes. But time has shown that many who are initiated into methodological naturalism slide into the conviction that only natural causes exist. The truth of the latter conviction, however, is neither evident nor demonstrable, and relying upon an uncertain assumption goes against rationality. Nor is it necessary to make such a presupposition in order to engage in good scientific work.

I propose an addendum to the description of the frame of mind for one engaged in the natural sciences: yes, look for natural explanations when doing science, but leave open the question of whether or not natural explanations suffice to explain everything. One who accepts the just-mentioned addendum will avoid saying whether a part or the whole of nature requires a supernatural cause. Thus, when faced with something that seems to have no plausible physical explanation, this person will say something like the following: "I can say is that no presently- known natural cause can plausibly explain this event, and I don't expect to find one, given the laws of nature as I understand them. But I must add that science leaves open the possibility that a plausible natural explanation may some day be discovered."

The same person who utters those words expressing a suspension of scientific judgment about an event might turn around and affirm, on the basis of considerations going beyond science, that he or she believes that God (and not just an unusual natural cause--not even a personal being with supra-human powers) is the cause of the event in question. Although this opinion in favor of the supernatural will not be a scientific one, it will nevertheless be entirely consistent with scientific principles. For example, one who learns that the sun has apparently spun around in the presence of 100,000 people precisely at the time and place predicted by a poor shepherd girl quite reasonably decide that this event has been brought about by God in order to give credence to the shepherd's accompanying message. This act of faith will be consistent with a scientific attitude as long as she or he doesn't claim to have proven scientifically that God has wrought this effect.

The proposed description of the scientific attitude needs a name. How about "methodologically silent openness" to the supernatural?

While we're at it, let's propose as a name for the other frame of mind: how about "naturalistic eschatology" for those who have made it their faith that science will eventually explain every thing that otherwise seems to have a supernatural cause, or "naturalistic dogmatism" for those who deny the very existence of the supernatural?

Labels:

Comments

Leo White said…
"methodological openness" sounds better
9:07 AM
Post a Comment

Popular posts from this blog

Dembski's "specified compexity" semiotics and teleology (both ad intra and ad extra)

Integral to Dembski's idea of specified complexity (SC) is the notion that something extrinsic to evolution is the source of the specification in how it develops. He compares SC to the message sent by space aliens in the movie "Contact." In that movie, earthbound scientists determine that radio waves originating in from somewhere in our galaxy are actually a signal being sent by space aliens. The scientists determine that these waves are a signal is the fact that they indicate prime numbers in a way that a random occurrence would not. What is interesting to me is the fact that Dembski relies upon an analogy with a sign rather than a machine. Like a machine, signs are produced by an intelligent being for the sake of something beyond themselves. Machines, if you will, have a meaning. Signs, if you will, produce knowledge. But the meaning/knowledge is in both cases something other than the machine/sign itself. Both signs and machines are purposeful or teleological
Post a Comment
Read more

continuing the discussion with Tim in a new post

Hi Tim, I am posting my reply here, because the great blogmeister won't let me put it all in a comment. Me thinks I get your point: is it that we can name and chimps can't, so therefore we are of greater value than chimps? Naming is something above and beyond what a chimp can do, right? In other words, you are illustrating the point I am making (if I catch your drift). My argument is only a sketch, but I think adding the ability to name names, as it were, is still not enough to make the argument seem cogent. For one can still ask why we prefer being able to name over other skills had by animals but not by humans. The objector would demand a more convincing reason. The answer I have in mind is, to put it briefly, that there is something infinite about human beings in comparison with the subhuman. That "something" has to do with our ability to think of the meaning of the cosmos. Whereas one might say"He's got the whole world in His han
2 comments
Read more

particular/universal event/rule

While listening to a recorded lecture on Quine's Two Dogmas of Empiricism, it occurred to me that every rule is in a way, a fact about the world. Think about baseball: from the p.o.v. of an individual player, a baseball rule is not a thing but a guide for acting and interpreting the actions of others.  But this rule, like the action it guides, is part of a concrete individual --i.e., part of an institution that has come into existence at a particular place and time, has endured and  may eventually go out of existence.  The baseball rule, as a feature of that individual, is likewise individual.  The term "baseball rule," on the one hand, links us to a unique cultural event; it can, on the other hand, name a certain type of being.  In this way, it transgresses the boundary between proper and common noun. If there were no such overlap, then we might be tempted to divide our ontology between a bunch of facts "out there" and a bunch of common nouns "in here.&qu
Post a Comment
Read more