The Human Question

Substance seems to Dreyfus to be something we must disengage from in order to think about.  Hence we lose that initial engagement in the world.  To talk of substance, therefore, is to instrumentalize one's world and to constitute dualities (such as inner/outer) that divorce us from being. I propose that substance is best understood by reflecting on a word that Aristotle was fond of using:  entelecheia (a word that conveys how something is continuously acting for a goal--a goal not extrinsic to its own activity but rather is for the sake of being active).  Entelecheia is a philosophical world used to describe how we act when engaged in the world.  Yet Arisotle uses it to describe substances.  The prime instance of substance, therefore, is a human being practically engaged.  Not a flat substratum thing, but a striver.  One who (on a good day) seeks to be fully alive.

His description of how something becomes present at hand... is inadequate if you are looking for an account of the origin of theoretical knowledge.  Speculative reason's wonder at the purpose/point of the whole is not the same as being puzzled about how some part before oneself works.  The latter is sub speculative. This may be more approproriate elsewhere but here goes, since I'm talking about Hediegger: standing still (because of awe or wonder) is still a mode of comportment.