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Do biology, consciousness violate the laws of nature?

Our answer to this question is a function of how we understand laws of nature.

If we see them as descriptions of forces at work--that is, as things forcing each other to behave a certain way, then we imagine that consciousness or biology would add another force to the mix, one that works against the other forces.

If we see laws of nature as descriptions of what things naturally try to do or as attractions, then the "trying to" or "seeking" that pertains to biology, animality or rationality does NOT countervail the lower level but rather gives it a super-directedness.  Think here of how an architect doesn't direct the bricklayer by applying force against the bricklayer's efforts (at least not on a good day).  Instead, the architect gets the bricklayer to direct his or her efforts toward a goal that is not just bricklaying, but housebuilding.

A helpful contrast here is between the Euclidian and non-Euclidian conceptions of parallel lines.  One looks at the parallel lines as they exist in a particular portion of a plane.  The other may look at them  as they exist at a particular portion of a sphere.  If you were to measure them at that same point, you might find that in both cases, a line crossing the two lines would divide into two right angles.

To anthropomorphize a bit, if you were a point that lived at that point where a line crossing the two parallel lines forms to right angles and wanted to travel from there so as to form a straight line, you would get different results, depending on whether you were traveling on the plane or the sphere.  In one case you would never intersect with the other point that likewise is traveling at a right angle... etc., to become a longer and longer straight line.  In the case of the sphere, however, the path formed by one point-becoming-line would intersect with the path formed by the other.  But in BOTH cases the point-becoming-a-line conforms to its "nature" in how it moves in a straight line.  In neither case does something force the point-becoming-a-line to alter from its path.

Similarly, perhaps, the physical components of a plant, animal or human continue to act according to their nature, even though they might get results that differ from a non-living being.  The behavior of atoms and molecules in biology, in animal engagement, and in the human to animal engagement are like the behavior of the point-becoming-a-line in the sphere.  The operation of atoms and moleules as we describe them in non-living things, on the other hand, is like that of the point-becoming-a-line in the plane.

(Note: the sphere is to the line what a higher level teleology is to a lower level.)

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