The Human Question

This is a rough sketch of a still foggy idea: One might think that emergence is a materialist position (a kind of trickle up theory).  But the only way in which the highest organisms can arise is through an openness to being.  And once one grants such openness, one also opens the door to analogy of being.... and the fullness of being. Furthermore, emergence of higher level operations is definitely not the mere increase in complexity.  Nor is it the kind of simplexity/whatever discussed in chaos theory (although these may be integral to it): at the highest level, it's intentionality, a kind of unity in multiplicity that is other directed.  And intentionality implies the being of what is intended.  Once one thinks in terms of being, it's very hard to avoid thinking about Being as in Supreme Being. Emergence is incomplete, because it's about operations, whereas what I'm looking for is something more basic... something called being.... as in operation follows ...

The following is an ironic/dialectical argument against the assumption that the mere claim that to every physical state there is a mental state (and vice versa) would, if granted, imply that mental states are not immaterial. First reply: Mental states may still be thoroughly immaterial, but also capable of downward causality upon physical (this is not my position, but I'm just pointing out the non-sequitur in the physicalist argumetn). Second reply: Or even if we posit ONLY bottom-up causality, we'd have a superfluous, epiphenomenal, mental state... which would be absurd... but not incapable of existing apart from matter.  Especially if the cognition had somehow transcends the limitations of space and time. Comment: Yes, the latter does seem to be grasping at straws, and I'm not that inclined to be a dualist.  But I thought it interesting to point out the non-sequitur in the physicalist basis for denying the existence of the non-physical.  And I think it's importa...

In order for there to be science, the same proposition must be known to have been first proposed, later tested, and finally confirmed/or/rejected. In order for these propositions to be recognized as having been the subject of scientific reasoning, they must have been compared by one and the same person. In other words, I can't know know that I am confirming a hypothesis unless I knew it as an initial hypothesis, then as object of experimental testing and finally as an explanation that has been confirmed or denied. In order for the same person to compare the same proposition at different times, the he or she must keep their identity through time. But if reductive materialism were true, then identity through time would be an illusion. In fact, there would be no such thing as even a momentary identity, for the self would be an illusion. But in such case, there would be no such one to compare the initial hypothesis with its confirming evidence. Nor would there be such a thing ...

It is inherently cartbeforethehorse-ish to talk/debate about free will prior to considering what it is to wish for an end . That is because wishing is presupposed by and inherent to choosing while choosing is partially constituted by wishing. By "wish" I mean to desire a specific kind of good. For example, to want to be healthy. The infinitive form indicates that there is something beyond the here and now about health as an object of desire. You want it for yourself, but not for a determine period: rather any time is a good time to be healthy. Note also that wishing to be healthy presupposes cognition of the object of desire, and cognition of healthy as such is already to transcend local time and place. More on that later. One who denies free will cannot deny wishing occurs. But wishing already offers evidence sufficient to overturn materialism. Also, prior to studying wishing and choosing, it is necessary to study the appetitive activity of animals lower than h...