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2+2=4 is not an event

Here is an excerpt from an email I sent to David B., arguing that "event" determinism is opposed to rationality.

Hello David:

I will argue against your conclusion with a math argument requiring knowledge of only basic arithmetic. I argue that to deny that we have free will on the basis of physical determinism is to imply that we are not rational, i.e., that we are not capable of knowing universal and necessary truths as such. But such an implication undermines the very math and science David uses to establish the thesis that we are predetermined. Hence David, your argument, when brought to its conclusion, is self-defeating.

Why? because if every event, including everything that we think is determined by a previous event, then it seems that our thinking that we really know that 2+2=4 is predetermined by previous event(s) as well. But if we are forced into thinking that the above equation (which is a stand-in for all claims to universal knowledge) is true, then it is also conceivable that we could be forced into thinking that 2+2=5: all this would require is that the right antecedent event occur to make us think we know that 2+2=5 is a mathematical truth.

There is nothing extraordinary about this last claim: it would be something akin to an hallucination.

So, given the determinist hypothesis, we can, under the right circumstances, be forced into thinking that we see the truth of a claim that, as a matter of fact, presently seems absurd to us. Furthermore, given the determinist hypothesis, the two cases (i.e., that of thinking we know that 2+2=4 and that of thinking that we know that 2+2=5) have no discernable differences, at least as far as our experience of grasping what is supposedly self-evident. In other words, given the determinist hypothesis, we can't we really know anything--including the basic claims of arithmetic, without which science cannot even begin. Because we can be FORCED into THINKING that we SEE the truth of claims that might not in fact true. Math loses its status as the source of necessary truths. Science becomes relativized, no longer a privileged form of rationality. In fact, rationality goes down the tube. So if the conclusion of David's argument is premised upon math and science, then his conclusion attacks his premises--surely a house built on sand.

Addendum: I propose that the reason why we should reject determinsm--at least "physical event" determinism, is because we CAN in fact see that the truth that 2+2=4 is necessarily true. But in such case, knowing this truth is not predtermined by a prior event. In fact, 2+2=4 is not itself an event at all!

How then do we know this necessary truth? I submit that in knowing that this and other truths are necessary ones, we are connecting to a source that transcends the flux (and necessity) pertaining to physcial events. Furthermore, I propose that our ability to know truths that transcend immediate physical limitations is the source of our freedom.

As Jesus said, the truth will set you free.

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