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Note to self re Aristotle

It's often complained that he thought the natural state for bodily things is rest, whereas we moderns know that it's movement.

But of course, he thought the natural state for heavenly bodies was ongoing circular motion. And didn't he also think that fire naturally moves up, earth and water move down (and Air somewhere in between)? Granted, they rest when they get to where they were heading (more accurately, they rest when they are impeded from getting closer to where they are heading). These were limited motions, unlike the endless revolutions of heavenly bodies. But he didn't look for an efficient cause of such motions, at least not in the same way that he might for the cause of an arrow's moving sideways through the air, for stuff made of earth (such as the arrow) does not naturally move sideways, let alone upward (which would obviousy be contrary to its tendency).

Shouldn't we say that the stuff of earth naturally moves downward until it reaches an impediment (the ground) rather than resting as if it had reached complete rest? I guess it's more completely where it tends to be than it was before, so a kind of completeness can be ascribed here.

The real novelty of Galileo (or was it John of Buridan?) was to find an intermediate between natural and non-natural motion.

Speaking of arrows, I may be missing the mark here... gotta study this some more.

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