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switching from the higher spheres to the higher symmetries

Okay: this may be a hot idea, or it may be plain nutty--but here goes:

Aristotle had the notion of the sublunar sphere and all within it being moved by the higher spheres. And the natural state of the motion of these spheres was motion rather than rest. We certainly don't have spheres any more, but from the point of view of physics (i.e., abstracting from biological questions) we do have a higher and lower. The higher has a kind of circularity about it. And a kind of simplicity about it (just as the movement of the spheres was thoguht to be circular. And the higher does drive the lower (at least until we get to questions of life). But the higher in this case is not above our heads. And it is not in any sense "macro" or large. Rather, it is micro. Yep, (at least if Stephen Barr is right) the smaller, less evident purely physical (i.e, apart from biological) processes have higher symmetry than the larger, more evident ones. Just as a marble (sez Barr) has more symmetry than a hexagon, yet the not-so-apparent circularity of the marble underlies and makes possible the more-apparent orderliness of the hexagon. And the less apparent physical level is naturally in motion.

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