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first moment of the universe

Some might argue that there cannot be a first moment of the universe, because every moment, by definition has a past from which it comes (as well as a future toward which...). Here is a counter-argument. Every adult human being has, whenever he or she makes an observation, a present that has a past (and is the at least partially fulfilling future of that now gone-by past). So that human might generalize and say that experiences of the present includes, as a component of that present, the past. But if we treat this generalization as a necessary truth, then no human can have an experience of the present that does not include its having come from the past. In such a case, no human being could have a finite age. Each must have an infinite series of presents, each of which has a past. Which seems pretty absurd. The move from experiencing the present as having a past to assigning a necessity to this relationship is unwarranted, both in this case and in the previous one.

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