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Questions to ask a hardcore materialist/reductionalist

Is human awareness identical with the electrical wave of excitation that travels down the axon? Or is it identical with the movement of vescicles carrying electrotransmitters in the presynaptic neuron? Or perhaps with the movement of these neurotransmitters across the synapse? Or perhaps with the excitation of the post-synaptic dendrite?
If human awareness is strictly identical with just one of these, then it follows that what appears to be one experience had by one human is really the sum of billions of interactive sub-human atom-experiences.
If human awareness is identical with one or many of these interacting as they do solely in virtue of what they have in common with chemical reactions outside the body, then it would follow that chemical reactions outside of the body are instances of consciousness as well. If the movement of calcium inside the cell wall of the presynaptic neuron is really an aspect of awaraeness, then the movement of calcium molecules outside a living being is an instance of awareness as well. A different sort of awareness, to be sure, b/c of the chemical differences. But a kind of awareness nevertheless. There are many very diverse electro-chemical-mechanical processes going on in an active neuron. If each of these is an aspect of awareness, then there are many qualitatively different awarenesses in us... and outside of us as well.
If the strictest form of materialism is true (one w/o even emergent properties) then everything is alive.... or dead.

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