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Another problem for the theory of mind

If the firing of the axon hillock were thought to be a kind of atom of cognition, then the following problem would emerge. The same axon hillock fires when many dendrites are moderately active at the same time, when they are active in a sequence, or when one axon hillock is very active. So is the firing of the same axon hillock at different times under different circumstances a different kind of cognitive act with a different object? Does this firing differ at different times because it possesses a different intentionality? Or is it the same regardless of what sort of dendrite activity caused it to fire? Both alternatives are problematic.

Of course we can escape this atomistic approach through holism (because holism requires that one take into account the differences in the dendrites as being partially constitutive of cognitive activity), but in order for that holism to work, the whole could not be the sum of its parts: one would have to reject reductionism.

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