Skip to main content

Emergentism

Emergentism states both that the mental is irreducibly different from the physical, and that the mental is founded upon the physical. But I think it errs in calling all mental activity (even perception) non-physical. For its understanding of "physical" is as whatever-can-be-the-object-of-study-in-the-natural-sciences. And it tends to reduce the object of natural science to what can be measured. And the criterion "what can be measured" tends to be combined with the false assumption that they have thereby totally de-anthropomorphized physics. As in getting rid of substance, qualitative differences and teleology.

But what if all of the objects to be measured by the natural sciences are derived from analogy with human action? And what if all science is to that degree anthropomorphic? If the answer is that they are the case, then there isn't really such a gulf between the mental and the physical, and the so-called divide between the objective thing and the subjective experience something we have created by misconstruing things. For the mental is not so non-physical as emergentism supposes and the physical is not so non-mental, at least not in the case of perception.

Emergentism attempts to be non-dualistic by looking at mind more like a verb than a noun. That is, "mind" is what the brain does, yet it is not reducible to what the brain's components, when conceived of in terms of what they have in common with non-lving things, as said to do. Nevertheless, there is something either problematic about emergentism. For the brain, which when conceived of in terms its commonality with non-living things would really be a collection of interacting things, should some how give rise to an operation that is so unitary (binding problem). If "minding" as a verb is unitary, it would seem that it comes from a unitary being as well. Action follows being. How could the unitary action of "minding" be housed in yet not reducible to the the multiplicity of "doings" or verbs had by the complex of neural entities (or of their component molecules/or of their component atoms/etc.) that we call the "brain"?

A much better alternative, in my opinion, is Aristotle's understand of matter and form... or to put it in my more scholoastic parlance: proximate matter and substantial form. More on that later... some day...

Comments

Unknown said…
Does that mean that for emergentism to work, you basically need to assume a kind of monism or pantheism, in order to not be dualistic?
Leo White said…
I hope not. What we need to do is to recognize that there are different kinds of material beings and that this difference doesn't fall under the purview of the scientific method. In other words, when you have a dog, for example, the dog is really one being: it lives as it acts, in a unitary manner (however fragile that unity may be).

The emergent-ist (uh, I'm not really an analytic philosopher, so I don't know how they name these fellows) makes a valuable acknowledgement of the irreducibility of mental acts to physical acts. This guy needs to recognize that there neither of these acts are immaterial (n.b., I'm not denying the immortality of the soul: I'm concerned at this moment with characteristics we share in common with dogs more than those we share with angels); he needs to recognize that there are different types of material beings (and actions); he needs to recognize that his conception of material being as something that precluded mental acts is the consequence of a positivistic view of nature. The positivists tend to reduce the physical to the quantifiable. But that gets rid of teleology, form, and essential differences among different types of material beings. It's an untterly impoverished way of viewing even non-living beings. And it's naive to how even our quantifications involve an analogy with human action. Take the notion of disposition, for example. You can't really measure disposition. Yet disposition is indispensable to talk of things in nature. But we understand disposition from reflection upon how we as humans engage in the world in our everyday, non-philosophical, non-scientific manner.

If you take all the nasty things I said about what is lacking in positivism and "posit" a natural science (or should we call it a natural philosophy?) that doesn't suffer from the same defects,then this discipline would be able to see how mental life is both esssentially different from non-living stuff, yet mental life is non some immaterial sort of stuff. It's a higher level of being had by some material beings.

If this ain't that clear it's in part b/c I'm working it out as I go along. Hope you enjoyed!

Popular posts from this blog

Dembski's "specified compexity" semiotics and teleology (both ad intra and ad extra)

Integral to Dembski's idea of specified complexity (SC) is the notion that something extrinsic to evolution is the source of the specification in how it develops. He compares SC to the message sent by space aliens in the movie "Contact." In that movie, earthbound scientists determine that radio waves originating in from somewhere in our galaxy are actually a signal being sent by space aliens. The scientists determine that these waves are a signal is the fact that they indicate prime numbers in a way that a random occurrence would not. What is interesting to me is the fact that Dembski relies upon an analogy with a sign rather than a machine. Like a machine, signs are produced by an intelligent being for the sake of something beyond themselves. Machines, if you will, have a meaning. Signs, if you will, produce knowledge. But the meaning/knowledge is in both cases something other than the machine/sign itself. Both signs and machines are purposeful or teleological

continuing the discussion with Tim in a new post

Hi Tim, I am posting my reply here, because the great blogmeister won't let me put it all in a comment. Me thinks I get your point: is it that we can name and chimps can't, so therefore we are of greater value than chimps? Naming is something above and beyond what a chimp can do, right? In other words, you are illustrating the point I am making (if I catch your drift). My argument is only a sketch, but I think adding the ability to name names, as it were, is still not enough to make the argument seem cogent. For one can still ask why we prefer being able to name over other skills had by animals but not by humans. The objector would demand a more convincing reason. The answer I have in mind is, to put it briefly, that there is something infinite about human beings in comparison with the subhuman. That "something" has to do with our ability to think of the meaning of the cosmos. Whereas one might say"He's got the whole world in His han

particular/universal event/rule

While listening to a recorded lecture on Quine's Two Dogmas of Empiricism, it occurred to me that every rule is in a way, a fact about the world. Think about baseball: from the p.o.v. of an individual player, a baseball rule is not a thing but a guide for acting and interpreting the actions of others.  But this rule, like the action it guides, is part of a concrete individual --i.e., part of an institution that has come into existence at a particular place and time, has endured and  may eventually go out of existence.  The baseball rule, as a feature of that individual, is likewise individual.  The term "baseball rule," on the one hand, links us to a unique cultural event; it can, on the other hand, name a certain type of being.  In this way, it transgresses the boundary between proper and common noun. If there were no such overlap, then we might be tempted to divide our ontology between a bunch of facts "out there" and a bunch of common nouns "in here.&qu