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Polkinghorne lists books that may discuss emergence in an interesting way

Actually, in The Faith of a Physicist, he lists four properties of modern physics brought up by Barbour. The first is the developmental nature of the universe, the second is the intertwining of chance and law; and the third is wholeness and emergence. The footnote lists other works that discuss these same properties (the last two have to do with biology, which is what I'm interested in):
Bartholemew 1984 God of Chance
Polkinghorne 1986 One World
Polkinghorne 1988 Science and Creation
Prigogine 1980 From Being to Becoming
Prigogine and Stengers 1984 Order out of Chaos
Peacocke 1979 Creation and the World of Science
Peacocke 1986 God and the New Biology
Must look into the last two...
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