Natural scientists aspire to be able to explain nature in quantitative terms : that is, terms of its common sensible characteristics as well as the force, and other quantifiable characteristics needed to explain changes in common sensible characteristics. out the recognition of the qualitative features of experience. Thomas Nagel recognized this problem in his article "What's it like to be a Bat?" That article points out that scientific knowledge of how a bat perceives can never convey the experience that a bat has from a bat's point of view. These perceptual notes are called qualia what it's like for a to perceive, so that if we never perceive things the way a bat does, we wouldn't know how to point out that part of nature that indicates that, when you've then you will leave out the recognition of the qualitative features of nature or experience, including the proper-sensibles. But that is not to say that these qualia are immaterial. Rather, it may indicate that nature itself (including perception and much more) possesses qualia
This is a nice way to try to avoid being cornered re the irreality of the self if you're a reductionist, for you can assert that a pattern obtains at the microscopic level that is not all that unlike the pattern found at the societal level. No need for the one self that does it all: instead, you have many sub-selfs that compete for dominance or take turns guiding the whole. The problem with this is, however, that the voters/officials are all zombies. None of them thinks about the whole as such. And perhaps none of them thinks even about themselves (unless one is a panzoist). None of them makes a comparison of alternatives. The more this proposed democracy seems like a zombocracy, the more consciousness will be seem to be epiphenomenal. Furthermore, if the oneness of the self is less real than the multiplicity of explanatory neural parts, then why can't each of these neural parts be conceived of as democracy as well? And why not parts of these parts, et...
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