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going batty over qualia

Natural scientists aspire to be able to explain nature in quantitative terms : that is, terms of its common sensible characteristics as well as the force, and other quantifiable characteristics needed to explain changes in common sensible characteristics. out the recognition of the qualitative features of experience. Thomas Nagel recognized this problem in his article "What's it like to be a Bat?" That article points out that scientific knowledge of how a bat perceives can never convey the experience that a bat has from a bat's point of view. These perceptual notes are called qualia what it's like for a to perceive, so that if we never perceive things the way a bat does, we wouldn't know how to point out that part of nature that indicates that, when you've then you will leave out the recognition of the qualitative features of nature or experience, including the proper-sensibles. But that is not to say that these qualia are immaterial. Rather, it may indicate that nature itself (including perception and much more) possesses qualia

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