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Dawkins and McGrath on talking terms

I listened to the unedited video of Dawkins' interview of McGrath for the former's BBC TV series titled "The Root of all Evil" or something like that.  They were most courteous to each other, and very careful in what they said.  They DID ask good questions as well as come up with interesting answers.  I really like McGrath, although I think that he sometimes kind of beats around the bush ... perhaps because the more direct, and more helpful answer hasn't come to his mind yet and he's buying time.  But in any case, he makes many excellent points, and is not to be matched for thoughtfulness.

One answer that he gave was on target as far as it went but I think a bit incomplete.  Dawkins asked (and I paraphrase), if a whole village with the exception of one child was killed by tsunami or the like, would you thank God for saving the child?  McGrath said yes, thereby avoiding the move of resolving the problem of evil by settling for the God of the deists.  But he didn't really say (in a manner that was clear to me) why he would thank God under such circumstances (and without of course blaming God for the deaths of the others).

My thought (Aquinas's really) is that reality, existence, is fundamentally a gift at each moment if God is continually preserving us in existence.  Those who thank God that the child's life was spared are simply recognizing that most basic gift... a gift that is being given at each moment.  Such gratitude does not suggest that a "miracle" in the strict sense has been performed.  But it does recognize God's providence in the working of nature.

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