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atheism, science and determinism

According to those who advocate methodological naturalism, we must presume that no process is an exception to the laws of nature: otherwise, (in those cases in which natural causes lay deeply hidden) we would fail to seek and eventually discover those causes.  This presumption is methodological; nevertheless, the  danger is that method will become dogma.  That is, one may end up thinking that one who wishes to foster scientific rationality must assert that there is no God who intervenes: "Law (and chance) account for everything; otherwise, nature can be regarded as a function of divine caprice."

But if the fruitful search for laws of nature requires ontological naturalism (i.e., the assertion  that there is no supernatural intervention), then it requires determinism as well. For if everything in nature is the result of the confluence of chance and law, then human freedom cannot exist; and if humans are not free, then  no science is possible!

It follows (modem tollens...) that adopting dogmatic naturalism for the sake of scientific rationality is self-defeating.

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