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ethics, nature, practices and community

Instead of talking about what is natural in terms of what-is-natural-in-itself-apart-from-our-regard-for-it, instead talk about what is natural (as in "second nature") quoad-nos (in relation to us) in virtue of our practices.  Then dig deeper till we find the contours of first nature within second nature... get insights into that which is natural "quoad omnes." At about the same time also look at the  nos and omnes, not as larger and larger collections of rational individuals, but as a members of a community.  Argue that affirming nature either entails or suggests an orientation toward and from the One who is head of the community of rational beings in virtue of constituting nature.

Disadvantage of not proceeding this way: without making this move, talk of what is natural in morality seems to be a question begging appeal to God as arbitrary craftsman/or/lawmaker.  It tends to sound like it wants to trump the arbitrariness of our conventions with divine arbitrariness.

Advantage of proceeding this way.  It gives the reasoner permission to consider in an almost playful manner, how and whether they would want society to regard certain things as natural.  It allows for them to see in hypothetical language how, if you regard this as natural for such and such a reason, then you must regard that other thing as natural too.  From there it allows them to discover what they could but don't have to/must/ must not/ regard as natural--at least given everyday common sense notions of what reasonable persons desire, avoid, etc.

Once one achieves some eidetic intuition about how a community must/mustnot/maybutdoesnthaveto regard actions, one can argue towards God as the First Cause of such a community.

The movement is from a manner of speaking that allows the moral relativist to reason toward something approaching an absolute.

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