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foggy intuitions about the naivete of ateleology re time and the consciousness thereof

We can abstract from teleology in our description of movement by plotting x and y coordinates where y is displacement and x is time.  But if time itself is the measure of motion, then the very way in which we plot movement in a sense presupposes it at a more basic level.  And it presupposes a human who measures.  So if our ability to propose a plausible mechanistic view of human action requires our imagining that human activity, being only a more complicated version of the sort of activity found in non-living things, can be graphed on Cartesian charts, ... if all that is presumed, then this mechanistic proposal likewise presupposes that which it would eliminate.  It uses a feature of humans that cannot be reduced to the mechanistic without acknowledging that it is doing so, precisely at the time that it claims to be reducing the human to the mechanical.

Note also that Cartesian-coordinate description of the human act of counting movement is impossible.  For the x axis (if that is designated for time) would in a sense presuppose that which it would be trying to describe.

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