It seems remarkable to me that Pierre-Simon Laplace, probably the greatest scientist in the century between Newton and Darwin and the first to propose scientific determinism, is also responsible for developing probability theory. Scientific determinism is a hypothesis that every state of affairs entirely determines the state of affairs that immediately follows it and is entirely determined by the state of affairs that preceded it, so that LaPlace's demon (a hypothetical intelligent being with complete knowledge of nature at a particular point in time), could both predict and retrodict any state of affairs in the same time continuum. Probability theory was developed by Laplace in order to overcome indeterminacy in his knowledge of the movement of heavenly bodies. He relied on different sources of data regarding this movement, and since these sources were inconsistent with each other, he had to find a way of making a most reasonable approximation. In other words, he developed probability theory in order to overcome the indeterminacy of his knowledge of nature.
These two claims -- one affirming determinism in nature and the other acknowledging a kind of indeterminism in our knowledge -- are not inconsistent with each other (although the very act of affirming the truth of determinism may be self-undermining for reasons not discussed here). But the fact that Laplace is responsible for formulating probabilistic rules to help him deal with the inexactness of astronomic observations underscores the fact that he neither experienced the determinism that he attributed to nature nor did he prove that such determinism exists. For what he experienced was sets of data from different sources that were inconsistent with each other. Only after he had used one set of calculations to settle upon approximate values did he use other calculations to understand and express how these values are related to each other. These relations between the values, said Laplace, are necessarily the way they are. This necessity, however, was not inferred from the data at hand. Rather, it originates from the mathematical lens with which he looked at values that were, in fact, approximations. The Laplacean interpretation of nature is a matter -- not of exegesis -- but of isogesis. It is more similar to the way in which a saint sees supernatural beauty in the world about him than it is to a straightforward scientific observation.
These two claims -- one affirming determinism in nature and the other acknowledging a kind of indeterminism in our knowledge -- are not inconsistent with each other (although the very act of affirming the truth of determinism may be self-undermining for reasons not discussed here). But the fact that Laplace is responsible for formulating probabilistic rules to help him deal with the inexactness of astronomic observations underscores the fact that he neither experienced the determinism that he attributed to nature nor did he prove that such determinism exists. For what he experienced was sets of data from different sources that were inconsistent with each other. Only after he had used one set of calculations to settle upon approximate values did he use other calculations to understand and express how these values are related to each other. These relations between the values, said Laplace, are necessarily the way they are. This necessity, however, was not inferred from the data at hand. Rather, it originates from the mathematical lens with which he looked at values that were, in fact, approximations. The Laplacean interpretation of nature is a matter -- not of exegesis -- but of isogesis. It is more similar to the way in which a saint sees supernatural beauty in the world about him than it is to a straightforward scientific observation.
Comments