When Dawkins clarifies what he means by the term "gene" in the title of his work, he states that it refers not an to individual but to a whole population of genes of a certain type. He then proposes that we apply a metaphor as a kind of shortcut for understanding the conclusions of mathematical genetics: imagine that the gene is an individual trying perpetuate itself by competing with its allele and cooperating with other genes in producing a vehicle that will behave in such a way as to enable the genes to survive to the next generation. According to this heuristic, those genes that are most ingenious at producing effective survival machinesl will tend to become predominant in a population.
This metaphor is, in my opinion, a great device for giving a basic idea about population genetics. But Dawkins also uses it to make a philosophical point, and in doing so seems to change the subject in a manner that is misleading. He talks of individual genes using an individual organism as a vehicle for surviving: "As the cistrons leave one body and enter the next, as they board, sperm and egg, for the journey to the next generation, they are likely to find that the little vessel contains their close neighbors of the previous voyage, old shipmates with whom they sailed..." This is clearly poetic language and shouldn't be taken as anything more than that. But there is a serious point behind this imaginative description: i.e., that individual genes use individual organisms as survival machines. The problem with this point is that to use something -- even in the metaphorical sense -- requires that one exist before and after the use of that thing. But individual genes come and go out of existence many times before an organism reproduces. So it couldn't be the case that these ephemeral entities act so as to survive to the next generation. Yet this metaphor seems at first glance to be a natural extension of the metaphor he has already introduced. What, then, is the problem?
I think the problem is that talk of replicators using organisms as survival machines is incoherent--even as a metaphor. That is because the gene signified by the term "selfish gene" is not an individual but a personification or idealization of a gene population. As an idealization it does not, pace Dawkins, interact with a concrete individual organism. To suggest that it does is to speak incoherently. But I may be misreading Dawkins: he may intend to depict the gene type (the idealization of a gene population) as using an organism type (the idealization or personification of a population of organisms). This alternative reading does not render the metaphor incoherent, but it does not seem to support the point Dawkins wishes to make about how individual genes and organisms interact. For the fact that a gene population can outlast a population of organisms (and in that sense uses the organism population) does not imply individual genes of that type use the respective individual organisms. To think that it does is to commit the fallacy of division. One can imagine scenarios in which two populations, A and B, interact with population A outlasting B, but without any individual in population A outlasting the individual in population B with which it interacts. The same is true for population A "using" population B. That this is in some sense true does not imply that an individual in population A uses an individual in population B. That is precisely what Dawkins supposes. And in so doing he commits the fallacy of division while forgetting, after he has drawn his conclusion, that he started with a metaphor.
This metaphor is, in my opinion, a great device for giving a basic idea about population genetics. But Dawkins also uses it to make a philosophical point, and in doing so seems to change the subject in a manner that is misleading. He talks of individual genes using an individual organism as a vehicle for surviving: "As the cistrons leave one body and enter the next, as they board, sperm and egg, for the journey to the next generation, they are likely to find that the little vessel contains their close neighbors of the previous voyage, old shipmates with whom they sailed..." This is clearly poetic language and shouldn't be taken as anything more than that. But there is a serious point behind this imaginative description: i.e., that individual genes use individual organisms as survival machines. The problem with this point is that to use something -- even in the metaphorical sense -- requires that one exist before and after the use of that thing. But individual genes come and go out of existence many times before an organism reproduces. So it couldn't be the case that these ephemeral entities act so as to survive to the next generation. Yet this metaphor seems at first glance to be a natural extension of the metaphor he has already introduced. What, then, is the problem?
I think the problem is that talk of replicators using organisms as survival machines is incoherent--even as a metaphor. That is because the gene signified by the term "selfish gene" is not an individual but a personification or idealization of a gene population. As an idealization it does not, pace Dawkins, interact with a concrete individual organism. To suggest that it does is to speak incoherently. But I may be misreading Dawkins: he may intend to depict the gene type (the idealization of a gene population) as using an organism type (the idealization or personification of a population of organisms). This alternative reading does not render the metaphor incoherent, but it does not seem to support the point Dawkins wishes to make about how individual genes and organisms interact. For the fact that a gene population can outlast a population of organisms (and in that sense uses the organism population) does not imply individual genes of that type use the respective individual organisms. To think that it does is to commit the fallacy of division. One can imagine scenarios in which two populations, A and B, interact with population A outlasting B, but without any individual in population A outlasting the individual in population B with which it interacts. The same is true for population A "using" population B. That this is in some sense true does not imply that an individual in population A uses an individual in population B. That is precisely what Dawkins supposes. And in so doing he commits the fallacy of division while forgetting, after he has drawn his conclusion, that he started with a metaphor.
Comments