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"intelligent design" is probably not the answer

I red the article about intelligent design. I want to read more about the reasons that the people that support this movement have but, I disagree with a position that affirm that intelligent design exist because there are things of the “biological” world that are not possible to explain. As Alberts said, science is the attempt to understand the world and all the science history shows that little by little we are answering important questions about our material world. I think that this doesn’t restrict two conditions that I consider very important: 1) the necessity to recognize that in the human experience there is a kind of reality that can not be treated in the same way as the material world. 2) to recognize that in the root of the material reality there is something that never will be explained with science. how things exist?, what set up the physical rules?, what is the origin of everything?. And these are very important question that one needs to try to answer, and the answer is not in science.
There is an interesting sentence of Cordova: “If I could prove even one small part of my faith through purely scientific methods that would be highly satisfying intellectually”. I think that this is a mistake. In order to know something is necessary to use the appropriate method. Science only is able to explain phenomena that can be measure. And so is not the appropriate method to approach the questions that have to do with the root of reality and with the root of man. The evidence of the existence of something beyond the appearance is in our experience. It is already in the fact that we have such a great desire to know, to understand our origin, in the wonder that we live in front of nature and in front of human being. In every true human experience there is something that pushes you to open yourself to something that is beyond. And there is no “mechanical” demonstration for that.

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