Alfredo,
I appreciated very much what you had to say about choosing the right method when studying nature.
In the article from nature that you reviewed, a scientist who is promoting intelligent design (ID) spoke of the need to prove one item of his faith through purely scientific methods." If the scientific method concerns only what we can measure, then it is hard to see how this method could prove the existence of God, who is immeasurable.
But being a dilettante at science as I am, I am tempted to ask whether natural science 1.) deals with things solely inasmuch as they are measurable, or 2.) whether it deals with things inasmuch as they act for a purpose. If one were to say that only the first alternative is correct, then wouldn't it be a case of science deriving its own method from mathematics? Would this be an extrinsic imposition of a method? If, on the other hand, one were to say that the second alternative is included in a genuinely scientific understanding of nature, then there may be a way in which the physical universe as understood by a scientist points to God. Certainly, Thomas Aquinas thought so when he spoke of even non-cognizant things as acting for an end.
Perhaps there is a distinction to be made between empirical science, which measures its object, and the philosophical consideration of nature, which may look at the purposes of things in nature.
Of course, for the positivist (i.e., one who has rejected religion as mere myth and who takes the scientific method as the model of objective reasoning)... for this person, my talk of purposes in nature is akin to someone from the 13th century talking of the sun rotating around the earth: it is mistaken appeal to common sense that is eventually overturned by scientific discovery. To the positivist, talk of purpose is an obstacle to truth. After all, astronomers before Galileo would deny that there can be great spaces between the planets because such gaps would have no purpose. Similarly, to talk in the 21st century about the purpose of natural phenomena is to cling to a medieval worldview. In the positivist's opinion, one who seeks the absolute truth about nature should leave behind all talk of subjective matters like purpose, and consider only what is objective, i.e., the quantifiable.
I propose that our response to the positivist should begin and end with the consideration of human nature that you bring up in the end of your posting. We already have a great desire to know our origin and destiny. There is something in this human wonder that rebuts the mechanistic view that the positivist has of nature. For we are part of nature, yet we are a part that looks at the whole and asks "why?" If the positivist were correct, then it would not even be possible to ask the "human question."
One last thing. I have read that critics of ID call it a "God-in-the-gaps" argument. This name implies that the ID theoriest points to not-yet-explained phenomena in nature (such as the operation of the human eye or the flagellum in bacteria) and says, "See, you can't explain how this has come into being, so God must have caused it."
A God-in-the-gaps argument deserves to be criticized. But William Dembski, the most famous proponent of intelligent design, denies that ID is such an argument.
We need to read a bit more on this topic. With that in mind, here are a couple of links to some articles.The first, written by William Dembski to the Princeton Theological Review at the following address:http://www.arn.org/docs/dembski/wd_teachingdesign.htm
The second is a criticism of both creationism and "Darwinian fundamentalism" by Michael Ruse, a critic of ID. I am not sure if his harsh criticism of creationism applies to intelligent design, as he doesn't speak specifically. Perhaps he is only directing his criticism against those who argue that the world is only 6,000 years old, etc. I do know, however, that he is a leading critic of ID who has entered into a public dialogue and debate with Dembski. We would do well to look into his more explicit criticisms of ID (as well, of course, as what Dembski has to say in support). Anyways, his article can be found at:http://www.beliefnet.com/story/7/story_762_1.html
I appreciated very much what you had to say about choosing the right method when studying nature.
In the article from nature that you reviewed, a scientist who is promoting intelligent design (ID) spoke of the need to prove one item of his faith through purely scientific methods." If the scientific method concerns only what we can measure, then it is hard to see how this method could prove the existence of God, who is immeasurable.
But being a dilettante at science as I am, I am tempted to ask whether natural science 1.) deals with things solely inasmuch as they are measurable, or 2.) whether it deals with things inasmuch as they act for a purpose. If one were to say that only the first alternative is correct, then wouldn't it be a case of science deriving its own method from mathematics? Would this be an extrinsic imposition of a method? If, on the other hand, one were to say that the second alternative is included in a genuinely scientific understanding of nature, then there may be a way in which the physical universe as understood by a scientist points to God. Certainly, Thomas Aquinas thought so when he spoke of even non-cognizant things as acting for an end.
Perhaps there is a distinction to be made between empirical science, which measures its object, and the philosophical consideration of nature, which may look at the purposes of things in nature.
Of course, for the positivist (i.e., one who has rejected religion as mere myth and who takes the scientific method as the model of objective reasoning)... for this person, my talk of purposes in nature is akin to someone from the 13th century talking of the sun rotating around the earth: it is mistaken appeal to common sense that is eventually overturned by scientific discovery. To the positivist, talk of purpose is an obstacle to truth. After all, astronomers before Galileo would deny that there can be great spaces between the planets because such gaps would have no purpose. Similarly, to talk in the 21st century about the purpose of natural phenomena is to cling to a medieval worldview. In the positivist's opinion, one who seeks the absolute truth about nature should leave behind all talk of subjective matters like purpose, and consider only what is objective, i.e., the quantifiable.
I propose that our response to the positivist should begin and end with the consideration of human nature that you bring up in the end of your posting. We already have a great desire to know our origin and destiny. There is something in this human wonder that rebuts the mechanistic view that the positivist has of nature. For we are part of nature, yet we are a part that looks at the whole and asks "why?" If the positivist were correct, then it would not even be possible to ask the "human question."
One last thing. I have read that critics of ID call it a "God-in-the-gaps" argument. This name implies that the ID theoriest points to not-yet-explained phenomena in nature (such as the operation of the human eye or the flagellum in bacteria) and says, "See, you can't explain how this has come into being, so God must have caused it."
A God-in-the-gaps argument deserves to be criticized. But William Dembski, the most famous proponent of intelligent design, denies that ID is such an argument.
We need to read a bit more on this topic. With that in mind, here are a couple of links to some articles.The first, written by William Dembski to the Princeton Theological Review at the following address:http://www.arn.org/docs/dembski/wd_teachingdesign.htm
The second is a criticism of both creationism and "Darwinian fundamentalism" by Michael Ruse, a critic of ID. I am not sure if his harsh criticism of creationism applies to intelligent design, as he doesn't speak specifically. Perhaps he is only directing his criticism against those who argue that the world is only 6,000 years old, etc. I do know, however, that he is a leading critic of ID who has entered into a public dialogue and debate with Dembski. We would do well to look into his more explicit criticisms of ID (as well, of course, as what Dembski has to say in support). Anyways, his article can be found at:http://www.beliefnet.com/story/7/story_762_1.html
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