Rejection of materialistic reductionism leads to rejection of physicalism

Reduction occurs when one set of laws that explain a set of facts is recast in terms of another set of laws that explain the same, differently characterized set of facts. This happens when when the latter characterization is concerned with the parts while the wholes described by the former, and when the laws pertaining to the latter are more general than the former. For example, Kepler's 3 laws of planetary motion can be reduced to Newton's laws of motion.

Materialistic reductionism of psychological events to chemical events is thought to be impossible because so many different physical conditions seem to occasion the same psychological event. For example, many people may think that George Bush was a poor decision maker: we may all think the same thought. But there need be nothing identical going on in our brains as we think the same thought. In fact, as I continue to think this thought through time, every part of my brain may undergo very minor changes while I adhere to the same thought. And a Martian who is silicon based-life-form rather than carbon-based may, after having observed U.S. Politics from 2001-2008, agree that George Bush is not a good decision maker, even though the chemical processes going on in his brain are quite different from mine.

So reductionism is undercut both by the fact that the same psychological event may occur when different psychical processes seem to underlie it.

We would have to reject the reduction of Keplerian laws to Newtonian laws if we discovered that something different were going on in planetary motion as understood by Newtonian physicis while the same event was going on as far as Keplerian laws were concerned.

But different physcial states can underlie the same psychological state, so we should reject the reduction of cognition to chemistry.

Digreesion But the same argument that undercuts reductionism might also undercut physicalism. For physicalism asserts that for each physical state there can be only one psychological state.

I need to think more about the latter claim.

In any case, the reason why the first theory breaks down is because it lacks room for intentionality. Intentionality has to do with the "towardness" of cognitive acts. A cognitive act is always directed toward something other than the act itself. By its nature, intentionality requires that cognition and its object be "other" than each other. And in virtue of the fact that the cognizer undergoes different phases of a process while cognizing the same object, it follows that there is a multiplicity of physical profiles which may underlie cognition of the same object.

Dembski's "specified compexity" semiotics and teleology (both ad intra and ad extra)

Integral to Dembski's idea of specified complexity (SC) is the notion that something extrinsic to evolution is the source of the specification in how it develops. He compares SC to the message sent by space aliens in the movie "Contact." In that movie, earthbound scientists determine that radio waves originating in from somewhere in our galaxy are actually a signal being sent by space aliens. The scientists determine that these waves are a signal is the fact that they indicate prime numbers in a way that a random occurrence would not. What is interesting to me is the fact that Dembski relies upon an analogy with a sign rather than a machine. Like a machine, signs are produced by an intelligent being for the sake of something beyond themselves. Machines, if you will, have a meaning. Signs, if you will, produce knowledge. But the meaning/knowledge is in both cases something other than the machine/sign itself. Both signs and machines are purposeful or teleological

continuing the discussion with Tim in a new post

Hi Tim, I am posting my reply here, because the great blogmeister won't let me put it all in a comment. Me thinks I get your point: is it that we can name and chimps can't, so therefore we are of greater value than chimps? Naming is something above and beyond what a chimp can do, right? In other words, you are illustrating the point I am making (if I catch your drift). My argument is only a sketch, but I think adding the ability to name names, as it were, is still not enough to make the argument seem cogent. For one can still ask why we prefer being able to name over other skills had by animals but not by humans. The objector would demand a more convincing reason. The answer I have in mind is, to put it briefly, that there is something infinite about human beings in comparison with the subhuman. That "something" has to do with our ability to think of the meaning of the cosmos. Whereas one might say"He's got the whole world in His han

particular/universal event/rule

While listening to a recorded lecture on Quine's Two Dogmas of Empiricism, it occurred to me that every rule is in a way, a fact about the world. Think about baseball: from the p.o.v. of an individual player, a baseball rule is not a thing but a guide for acting and interpreting the actions of others. But this rule, like the action it guides, is part of a concrete individual --i.e., part of an institution that has come into existence at a particular place and time, has endured and may eventually go out of existence. The baseball rule, as a feature of that individual, is likewise individual. The term "baseball rule," on the one hand, links us to a unique cultural event; it can, on the other hand, name a certain type of being. In this way, it transgresses the boundary between proper and common noun. If there were no such overlap, then we might be tempted to divide our ontology between a bunch of facts "out there" and a bunch of common nouns "in here.&qu

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