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possibly embarrassing questions to both sides of the ID. Natural theology considered

To opponents of ID: If someone successfully demonstrated that one feature of nature (I'll call it D below) must have been intelligently designed, then wouldn't this demonstration be able to withstand any number of counter-examplesof parts of nature that manifest either poor design or natural selection?

To proponents of ID: If D is sufficient to demonstrate the existence the intelligent designer, then wouldn't the counterexamples that opponents would doubtlessly mention be relevant to the question of the designer's goodness, power and wisdom? Wouldn't the preference for a natural explanation that goes along with the scientific method require that one who recognized the need for an intelligent designer grant only as much intelligence and power to this designer as would suffice to enable it to produce the observed effects?

My comment: at the end of the day the ID argument proceeds as if God were an engineer of biomechanisms, and those who think evolution disproves God have the same conception of the divine in mind. Both are mistaken.

Classical natural theology bypasses this debate: it attempts to demonstrate on the basis of features present in the world here and now that nature is continuously caused to continue to exist by a Being that is immaterial, infinitely perfect (and whose perfections include knowledge and freedom) and unique. These arguments are in no way undercut by the fact that the world is a bit of a mess. They work with or without evolution. They prove more than could be hoped for by the most ambitious and successful argument for intelligent design ever could.

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