The Human Question

The less relevant a claim is to our immediate survival, the more reliably true it can be. That 2+3=5 always and everywhere is never relevant to our immediate survival; whereas that these (two) plus those (three) equal five may well be relevant on occasion, yet the former is more reliably true than the latter.

In his Briefer history of time, he states the two following errors: 1. That up until the time of Columbus it was commonly believed that the earth was flat. Well, if by commonly he means other than the educated class, well, maybe so. But even in the 13th century Thomas Aquinas begins the Summa theologiae by mentioning in an offhand way that we know the earth is round thanks to principles of geometry. 2. That it was Church doctrine for centuries that the earth is the center of the universe. Uh, I know of no such doctrine.

I just learned that in my previous posts I got physicalism/supervenience wrong. Correct understanding: supervenience is the claim that a cognitive act is realizable in different instances, and in different kinds of matter. Physicalism is the denial that there is anything other than a materially realized version of consciousness.

Noe points out that the question, "How do you know that you aren't a brain in a vat?" has been used in order to undercut our tendency to take for granted that we have an immediate experience of and interaction with our environment. The expected answer, "I don't know," is supposed to lead us to conclude that our brain is directly aware only of internally produced representations while our body is a kind of vat that houses, nourishes, stimulates and responds to the brain. For if it could be a brain in a vat, then one two different stimuli may cause the same cognitive act; in which case it would follow that this cognitive act is not intrinsically ordered toward either of the possible causes. The most appropriate reply would be to show how representationalism runs into problems, regardless of any concern about brains, vats, and the like. But apart from those types of replies I might also argue that merely not knowing with 2+2=4 certainty that one's everyd...

He compares the meaning of words to the value of currency. Words that fall out of use can no longer be used meaningfully in conversation just like coins belonging to a currency no longer in use. This comparison underscores a point that he credits to Putnam: that we are able to use language meaningfully in part because we belong to a community of language users, including those who, perhaps unlike us, know how to apply the terms correctly. For example, says Noe, he can speak meaningfully about the difference between two kinds of trees (elms vs. oaks) even though he himself cannot distinguish one from the other.

A question for those who regard the operation of the brain as computer-like, as calculative: When I throw a ball in the air, it travels in a parabolic path: am I to say that the ball and earth combine to calculate a parabola? If the answer is "no," because this is just a natural process that happens to form a parabola, then why assume that neural processes are anything more than a more complicated version of the same? If the answer is "yes," then isn't every process a calculation, so that there is nothing special about calculation characterizing neuronal activity, and either everything is conscious in some manner OR simply being a calculation does not suffice to characterize a process as cognitive.

"We bark at our children" to get them to school on time.

When we judge, we don't think about our act of judging, at least not in the way that we think speculatively about an object.

The proposal that Noe rejects is that we start with an individualistic grasp the features of our environment, and then use this as the basis for INFERRING the existence of other, hidden selves. The theory of mind is such an inference. The basis for this understanding of mind is that children around three make a transition from failing to passing the false belief test. The explanation commonly given for this transition is that in order to pass this test we must first acquire a theory of mind. He rejects this explanation. We initially fail this test, NOT because we lack a"theory of mind," but because we initially lack the ability to distinguish our own feelings from those of others. Prior to passing the false belief test, we are already comindful, coaffective and cooperative with another. To illustrate this claim he first points out that the "other" at this phase is typically the mother: as a child we feel loved by her; if she withdraws her affectionate gaze...

He points out that a patient in so-called PVS (permanent vegetative state) has markedly low global brain metabolism (like that of a person in slow wave sleep, or under general anesthesia). But what is remarkable is the fact that in the rare case in which such a patient recovers consciousness, they still show a reduced brain metabolism. In other words, a low brain metabolism is not sufficient to demonstrate PVS.