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Noe's nifty take on why the very young fail the false belief test, i.e., why their awareness of others

The proposal that Noe rejects is that we start with an individualistic grasp the features of our environment, and then use this as the basis for INFERRING the existence of other, hidden selves. The theory of mind is such an inference.

The basis for this understanding of mind is that children around three make a transition from failing to passing the false belief test. The explanation commonly given for this transition is that in order to pass this test we must first acquire a theory of mind.

He rejects this explanation. We initially fail this test, NOT because we lack a"theory of mind," but because we initially lack the ability to distinguish our own feelings from those of others. Prior to passing the false belief test, we are already comindful, coaffective and cooperative with another. To illustrate this claim he first points out that the "other" at this phase is typically the mother: as a child we feel loved by her; if she withdraws her affectionate gaze, we are stressed. When being fed, we engage in a natural, spontaneous pattern of give and take. But can do all this while not yet distinguishing our self from other. (Here I'm trying to fill for a gap in Noe's argument) and when we eventually make that distinction, we do so without having formed a theory of mind: instead of thinking speculative about the other as such, we learn how to behave toward one who feels differently than we do.

An aside: it seems that either I or the Alva dude might not have gotten this right: seems that kids may flunk the false belief test even after having acquired the ability to distinguish one's actions from one's mother's.

Another aside: when a very young child closes its eyes, it imagines that everyone else can't see as well: it doesn't fail to recognize that there are perspectives had by others: rather it fails to recognize that those perspectives involve a content other than their own. The child assumes that "what we see together we also see in the same way": such an assumption involves the recognition of the "we."
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