The Human Question

Here is a sketch of an argument about divine foreknowledge and human freedom.  It works by applying the logic of foreknowledge to God's own actions, shows the absurdity at that level, then applies it to God's foreknowledge of created actions.  If we are free, then it is because God freely created us.  For if God's knowing what is going to happen causes that thing to happen, then God's knowing what God is going to do forces God to do that thing.  But God does know what God is going to do, so that, ex hypothesi, everything that God does would be something that God has to do.  God would be a robot, if foreknowledge implied causal necessity.  And of course, in such a case, the creation of the universe would be necessitated rather than free, and our action would likewise be necessitated.  But given that we are free, it follows that God created us freely AND foreknowledge does not involve coercian.

Hi Xxxx and Yyy Gee it's great that we're talking about this.  Xxxxx, you tried to set up some sort of philosophical discussion site... maybe facebook is better than email for this sort of thing.  In any case, I'd like to reply in as gracious and thoughtful a manner as you all did. Xxxxx:  If freedom is an illusion then SCIENCE is an illusion as well.  That is because science exists only because scientists BELIEVE that they are able to choose the more rational of two alternative explanations.  But if--contrary to appearances--they are coerced into choosing as they do by unseen forces, then they are mistaken in their belief in their ability to choose what is more reasonable.  Science, like every other supposedly rational enterprise, would therefore be an illusion.  Or to put it in other words:  there would be no such thing as scientific knowledge. Yyy: You argue clearly and thoughtfully.  I would say that there may be a proof of God's ex...

Where was quantum theory before Einstein and Plank thought of it:  in a state of superposition?

Doesn't this problem dissolve if cognition is related to comportment (bodily interaction) as an adverb is to a verb? Is that the jist of Heidegger's destruction of Cartesian dualism?

Scientists say that the speech areas (those that kick in when we are hearing or expressing) are larger in humans than in other primates.  Yes, but why?  I know it's supposed to be in our genes, but I can't help but wonder about how much of the larger size of these areas is a function of practices rather than DNA.  Consider the brain of a violinist: the area responsible for the control of his hand movement is larger than it is for non-violinists (who don't use hand skills with the same level of precision).  This largeness, however, is a function of practices.  It's large because he's a violinist rather than vice versa. Why can't the same be true for humans vis-a-vis non-humans?  In other words, it may be the case that humans have larger areas for communication than non-humans have for the same because humans are such intensive communicators.  Perhaps the average Joe is, in comparison to the bonono, a maestro at gesturing. I need to restudy about t...

David Hume divides knowledge into matters of fact, which are about things outside of our minds abut admit of no necessity, and relations of ideas, which involve necessity but do not inform us about the outside world. What if I had a hunch that all 3x4x5 triangles are right triangles?  That is, a hunch based upon a pattern I have observed in drawings of such triangles in the past.  Such a hunch or expectation would be a matter of fact, based upon experience, measurement, rather than a relation of ideas.  BUT what if I later proved tomyself (with the help of the Pythagorean formula) that such a triangle HAD to be a right triangle (with appropo qualifications re Euclidian vs. non-Euclidian geometry)?  The latter is, in Hume's schema, a relation of ideas; so it is not supposed (in Hume's opinion) to give one information about matters of fact. But it does.  Ask yourself:  after learning the Pythagorean formula don't you know MORE about the drawing of the ima...

If it provokes evolutionary scientists to develop strict algorithms for demonstrating the randomness of mutation, as opposed to "looks like a duck" arguments (e.g., what Dawkins says about the vagus nerve of a giraffe).

What if a wave is to a particle as a verb is to a noun:  might matter ultimately a kind of gerund?