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sighs about size

Scientists say that the speech areas (those that kick in when we are hearing or expressing) are larger in humans than in other primates.  Yes, but why?  I know it's supposed to be in our genes, but I can't help but wonder about how much of the larger size of these areas is a function of practices rather than DNA. 

Consider the brain of a violinist: the area responsible for the control of his hand movement is larger than it is for non-violinists (who don't use hand skills with the same level of precision).  This largeness, however, is a function of practices.  It's large because he's a violinist rather than vice versa.

Why can't the same be true for humans vis-a-vis non-humans?  In other words, it may be the case that humans have larger areas for communication than non-humans have for the same because humans are such intensive communicators.  Perhaps the average Joe is, in comparison to the bonono, a maestro at gesturing.

I need to restudy about this: maybe the claim is that we have a unique area rather than have an area of a unique size.  Maybe this area is larger even in early infancy. And maybe someone who aspires to become a violinist needs to have talented hands and these are in turn a function of genes.

Assuming I am not totally off base, it would be interesting to find out the size of the language use area(s) in someone who never learned to communicate.  Feral children would make an ideal control group, but then again generating such a control group would be a wee bit controversial.

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