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my post to a family member and friend on FB re God stuff

Hi Xxxx and Yyy

Gee it's great that we're talking about this.  Xxxxx, you tried to set up some sort of philosophical discussion site... maybe facebook is better than email for this sort of thing.  In any case, I'd like to reply in as gracious and thoughtful a manner as you all did.

Xxxxx:  If freedom is an illusion then SCIENCE is an illusion as well.  That is because science exists only because scientists BELIEVE that they are able to choose the more rational of two alternative explanations.  But if--contrary to appearances--they are coerced into choosing as they do by unseen forces, then they are mistaken in their belief in their ability to choose what is more reasonable.  Science, like every other supposedly rational enterprise, would therefore be an illusion.  Or to put it in other words:  there would be no such thing as scientific knowledge.

Yyy: You argue clearly and thoughtfully.  I would say that there may be a proof of God's existence (I happen to think there is), but even if there isn't a completely compelling one (--so that belief becomes a matter of choice--) it still may be the case that one of these two choices (that is, belief in God or disbelief in God) is better than the other one.  Choosing to believe in God may be like many other choices we make in life:  it's our choice whether to think democracy is better than a totalitarian state, inasmuch as no one can prove scientifically that the former is better than the latter.  But I would be ready to offer good reasons why the former seems to be a lot more reasonable choice. 

I propose that the same is true for believing in God: I can offer good reasons for belief, and even if they do not compel you, it may  still be more reasonable to decide (freely) that God does exist than deny God's existence.

Before going over your excellent reply to my previous post, please allow me to rehash my initial argument that belief in human freedom supplies a good reason for rejecting atheism:

My argument, in a nutshell (which may be where you think it belongs):  If there is no God, then materialism is true, in which case, we have no freedom.  Let me add to the original argument the fact that materialists also deny that there is such thing as a self: your identity as a person is an illusion as well. But, relying (like scientists do) on our common sense conviction that we are free beings, I reply that materialism must be false, as well as atheism.

And now for your counter-argument: if God knows what we are going to do, then we are not free either.  So if both sides of the theism/atheism debate deny human freedom, then it's a toss-up as far as that issue is concerned... it's just a matter of what you prefer to believe.

My reply is to ask you a question that at first seems to be changing the topic, but is crucial: do you know that Bryan lives in California?  If you really know that then it follows necessarily that Bryan does live in California.  But the word "necessarily" doesn't mean that you forced Bryan to live in California. 

Ditto with God.  If God knows what we are doing X, then it necessarily follows that we are doing X, but that doesn't mean that God is forcing us to do X by knowing it.  We can still be free even if God knows what we are doing.

But you might reply that God knows what we are going to do BEFORE we do it. 

My reply is that, if God were just a super-duper powerful creature, then the only way He could absolutely know what someone else is going to happen next would be by "loading the dice," that is, pre-programming us so that we HAVE to do it.  

Your objection works IF you think of God as a super-Zeus or something like that.  But if you think of God in that way then you would be ignoring what theists have said about God. 

When theists develop arguments for God's existence, they end up with something quite unlike Zeus.  They end up with is a being that is perfect and unchanging, and hence not subject to the changes of time.  Such a being doesn't "know ahead of time" in the same way that we do.  That is because such a being is NOT confined by time. He has no past, present or future; otherwise, God would be subject to change, would lose or gain perfection: God would not be God.

If God is unchanging, then your objection does not apply.

It's easy to object that there is not basis for positing such an unchanging being.  But I would point out that anyone who believes in science believes in unchanging truths (as in the truths of mathematics and logic)... so that it's not as big of a stretch as it may sound at first glance.

Of course, this is all abstract stuff... in my day to day personal life I think the greatest sign that there is a God is the common sense conviction that we are more than a collection of molecules, that we are free, that our lives have a point, that on a good day, we are able to know truths that can guide our lives in a meaningful direction.  All of these point, in my opinion, to God. 

I suppose one can object that all of those common sense convictions give the illusion that there is a God.  Anyone who thinks long and hard about this objection, however, would have to admit that they in such a case science would be just as much of an illusion as God. 

I think it wiser to affirm both rather than deny either of them.

If you are still awake, then I congratulate you!  Thanks also for your patience!  I hope you enjoyed! 

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