An important premise in Engel v Vitale (as well as in Lee v. Weisman) is the claim that the vulnerability of children deserves special consideration. What would not constitute compulsion for an adult WOULD do so for a child (even the children of parents who don't mind such compulsion). That point is integral to the argument that would prohibit school prayer while not touching the practice of having chaplains lead Congress in prayer and the like.
If the vulnerability of children is sufficient to render this sort of judgment against school prayer in Engel, then it should also suffice to render special regulation of pornography as such (and not merely as obscenity, i.e., as offensive). The vulnerability of children to porn... even the children of parents who don't care about that vulnerability merits state protection.
The analogy made above lacks the following parallel. In one case the vulnerability is to action by the State, in the other it is vulnerability to action by other individuals. But I don't think this difference weakens the argument.
If the vulnerability of children is sufficient to render this sort of judgment against school prayer in Engel, then it should also suffice to render special regulation of pornography as such (and not merely as obscenity, i.e., as offensive). The vulnerability of children to porn... even the children of parents who don't care about that vulnerability merits state protection.
The analogy made above lacks the following parallel. In one case the vulnerability is to action by the State, in the other it is vulnerability to action by other individuals. But I don't think this difference weakens the argument.
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