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from a letter to my bro... on justice and God

... I propose that if we have a good reason to seek justice, then we have a good reason to believe in God.

The same claim from another angle: if one denies that there is a God, then one has undermined belief in justice.  An atheist may insists that there is such a thing as justice, but such a claim is ultimately inconsistent.  Granted he or she won't see that inconsistency, but it will nevertheless be there. 

Let me clarify a couple of things.

First: I am NOT saying that one must FIRST believe in God or else he will have no reason to be just.  Atheists often misrepresent the theistic position in that way and then spend a lot of time pointing out how some atheists are ethical.  But such a fact does not weaken my thesis: it merely shows that atheists, like all other human beings, can be inconsistent.  I'll explain below. 

The following analogy will help make my point.  Imagine a deluded science major who insisted that one must first believe in nuclear fusion before one can believe in sunlight. 

We would point out to him or her that one FIRST believes in sunlight, then seeks an explanation, and after much seeking one discovers the cause of what one had previously observed.  One who understands that nuclear fusion causes sunlight knows that the latter (sunlight) cannot exist without the former (fusion).  But that does not mean that one can't think of (sunlight) without first having thought of (fusion).  Furthermore, not everybody recognizes the source of sunlight.  Some very intelligent people may deny it.  But those who deny that nuclear fusion even exists yet insist that there is such a thing as sunlight will ultimately end up in an inconsistency.  Of course, they don't recognize that inconsistency, but it will nevertheless turn up.

Analogy applied to justice and ethics: first one has some notion of justice, then one seeks to understand how it is that humans recognize that some actions are just and others are unjust.  On a really good day (I propose) one recognizes that all purpose comes from God.  One therefore sees that purpose (including justice) cannot exist without God.  But that is not the same as saying that one can't think of truths regarding justice without thinking of God.  One certainly can, just like one can think of sunlight without thinking of fusion.  But to DENY that God exists yet insist that there is such a thing as justice is to be inconsistent, just like the person who denies the existence of nuclear fusion yet believes in sunlight.  Both deniers are ultmately inconsistent, even though they may not be able to recognize their own inconsistency.

One way to avoid the conclusion that I am arguing for is to deny that there is such a thing as justice: you can instead claim that it's a fabrication--a form of mob control.  Fine: be that way.  You have undermined the argument.  But you have also assaulted human dignity.  For if justice is an illusion, then so is the intrinsic value of human beings.  You might as well say, with The Cure, "It makes no difference whether we're dead or alive." 

Atheism leads to nihilism.

On the other hand, if human beings really do have an intrinsic worth, then there is a God who is the Light and Destiny of us all.

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