I would like to argue that altruistic behavior is derived from the valuing of a good that one has shared with the one for whose sake one acts. The problem, however, seems to be that the altruist doesn't hope to enjoy that common good: that is, if you give your life to save your children, then once you're dead you are no longer enjoying the good of community. But at the moment you are acting for their good, you are sharing in some sense sharing that good with them and possibly doing so more abundantly than you otherwise could. So you not only act so that they will live well later on, but to be with them-later-on right now.
Here is a summary and comments on the essay Freedom and Resentment by PF Strawson. He makes some great points, and when he is wrong, it is in such a way as to clarify things a great deal. My non-deterministic position is much better thanks to having read this. I’ll summarize it in this post and respond in a later one. In a nutshell: PFS first argues that personal resentment that we may feel toward another for having failed to show goodwill toward us would have no problem coexisting with the conviction that determinism is true. Moral disapprobation, as an analog to resentment, is likewise capable of coexisting with deterministic convictions. In fact, it would seem nearly impossible for a normally-constituted person (i.e., a non-sociopath) to leave behind the web of moral convictions, even if that person is a determinist. In this way, by arguing that moral and determinist convictions can coexist in the same person, PFS undermines the libertarian argument ...
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