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letter re miracles

Okay, _____, I just finished grading yesterday, so I'm happy to return to our conversation.

And yes, bro Steve White, Pascal's Wager, figures in quite well here. Especially when combined with William James' "The Will to Believe." But lets get back to the conversation we were having.

First of all you have me contradicting myself, saying at one time that anything that can't be explained by nature is a miracle and then saying at another time that some things that cannot be explained by nature are not miracles. I don't remember saying either of these precisely as you have stated them. But I do remember saying that an event's not being explainable by natural processes is ONE of the characteristics of a miracle. There's more to it than that. 

1st description of an event: Suppose something really, really inexplicable happens: the sun appears to move in a swirling fashion and come closer to earth, so that it's seen and reported as having behaved in this way by tens of thousands of people within a ten mile radius. Prior to this event, they were all drenched in the rain; after it happened they were all dry. These details are reported in the newspaper by a journalist who himself is skeptical about the supernatural but who was there at the time that it happened and witnessed it himself. All this does not seem to be sufficient to say that it was a miracle. 

2nd description of the same event: Suppose that months before the aforementioned event happened, someone predicted that it would happen in order to corroborate a message from God. Suppose that same person also made prophecies that seemed implausible at the time but which happened over the next fifty years. I'd call THAT a miracle: the Miracle of Fatima. 

The difference is that in the second description (of the same event), we have indications that some higher being (aka God) is trying to communicate to us and is using the miracle as a sign. It's reasonable to interpret that event as something deliberately caused by a superior personal being who wants to communicate with us. It's really going against good judgment to say, "It seems MUCH more plausible that it's an enormous coincidence." You COULD say the latter, but I would put that statement in the "Well, my wife might really be a robot" category of objections: utterly implausible.

You also said the following: "It also seems like you're saying that miracles only mean anything if you already believe in, and are up to date on, your Christian [theology]. I disagree."

(n.b., I found "Christian mythology" needlessly insulting, so I took the liberty of changing your wording...)

Your characterization of my argument is a bit unfair... but not entirely. It's true that I said something to the effect that because I have good reasons for believing in Christ and in what Christianity teaches about Him, I have good reasons for doubting that Hindu miracles are legit. But "having good reasons" is not the same thing as saying, "I absolutely know that you are wrong and I'm gonna plug my ears if you try to tell me about it..." 

Look, my commitment to Christ and his Church is like a marriage vow. So if you were to come to me and say, "How do you know that your wife is not committing adultery?" I would reply that I have a good reason for thinking that you're wrong: but I can't prove that your claim is false. And if you tell me that you've got evidence -- not just hearsay but serious evidence -- then I'll say let's have a look. It would be silly to propose that I should live my live as if my wife could be an adulteress when I have good reasons for believing that she is faithful to me. 

Since, you do not have the same access as I do to my reasons for trusting my wife, you might be more open than I am to the possibility that she is unfaithful. But if you hear of rumors and then report them to me, I will doubt that they are true. And if you insist, then I will demand CORROBORATING facts before I begin to suspect my wife. Demanding those facts is not an example of being biased: it's an example of prudent faithfulness to the one I love.

Can you see the application to miracles? I have access to good reasons for believing that Christ is who Christians say He is. I know of some miracles that help confirm that belief. Your reporting a rumor of Hindu miracles is not the same thing as solid counter-evidence. It's a rumor, hearsay, chatter, gossip. So I am asking you to SHOW ME THE EVIDENCE . That is not being stubborn: it's simply being reasonable...and faithful to the One whom I love.


You also say, "If I see any dude appear in front of me, I should be able to recognize it as a miracle (given I'm not on drugs). Or if a Polynesian dude saw God 10,000 years ago, he should have been able to know it was a miracle. Etc. 
and etc."

Yes. If a Polynesian due saw a vision 10K years ago, it might have been of God. Same with the possibility that God or an angel might appear to you here and now. But I am assuming, for the moment that nothing in the message attending these visions would be inconsistent with other miracles, such as the miracle of Fatima. If they are not consistent, then I am sure you will point that out. 

You ask another question that impresses me, as it shows you have analyzed what I wrote quite carefully: "Although I don't follow the logic of how something that's already proven deductively (God is the first mover is a deduction) can be affirmed inductively."

Here's my answer: let's divide adults into two groups. The 1st consists of people who have access to deductive arguments for God's existence. The second consists of those who already have access to persuasive (but non-miraculous) evidence that God exists, even though that evidence does not form an ironclad, deductive argument. We might say that folks in the second group have a strong hunch that there's a God, but they are free to ignore it. Some of them will choose to believe anyways, even though the evidence is not incontrovertible. Some of the members of the second group, however, will doubt God's existence. Miracles may move some of these doubters to faith in God (think of the proverbial "doubting Thomas." As for those who already believed in God: miracles can be important for them as well. Miracles will give them something that they earnestly seek: a more personal personal connection with the One whom they regard as the key to a happy and meaningful life. 

Your last objection: "My problem with your evidence for Fatima is largely that it's not reproducible."

_____, miracles are not typically reproducible (maybe Lanciano is an exception), but there is another sort of evidence for God that IS reproducible. Before I get to that, however, let me say something about reproducibility. 

Fatima, if it is genuine, is an historical event. And like other historical events, it is not reproducible. WWII is not reproducible; WWI is not reproducible; the Civil War is not reproducible, etc. but we do not doubt these events. When we question whether or how these events happened, we are asking the sort of question that doesn't demand an answer that is reproducible--at least not reproducible in the same sense that a lab test is reproducible. This lack of reproducibility, however, is not reason for skepticism about the truth of history. 

What you need to remember is that to study an historical object we must use an historical method. We crack open history books; we learn foreign languages; etc. It would be bad science to try to figure out how the Krebb (sp?) cycle works by getting out old books and try to find out what scientist did what and said years ago. It would be bad history to take a history book into a chemistry lab and try to break it down into its elements. 

The object determines the method. Hence if you are asking an historical question, then you have to use an historical method. 

So your problem with Fatima is a problem with history. Do you believe that George Washington was the first president of the United States? If you do, then did you find a way to confirm this belief via evidence that is reproducible?

Jumping around a bit but I think you'll get the gist of what I'm saying: The most important practical decisions that you will make in your life are based upon facts that are not reproducible. Your decision to marry your (wonderful) wife is an example. The decision -- should you make it-- to believe in God, in Christ, and in His Church, is that sort of decision.

One challenge that I haven't met is to show you reproducible evidence of an immaterial world. I have something to say in response that I think you'll like: but I have to do so work around here before my wife gets ticked off (when I start typing fast she always asks me, "Another email about God and the Infinite?" which is sometimes followed by a remark about something that needs fixing in the house....)

Ciao, dude... till next time...

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