Skip to main content

thought experiment re neuronal firings for two contradictory propositions

I would like test materialism.

Take one set of neuronal firings X1 as pertaining to a proposition P1 that contradicts P2, to which neuronal firings X2 pertains.

Is it physically impossible for both X1 and X2 to fire "together" in the way in which they would for one who affirms any two propositions as simultaneously true?

If it is not physically impossible, then it is possible to affirm two contradictories as simultaneously true.

If it is physically impossible, AND if materialism is true, then wouldn't that affirming a contradiction be impossible because of of the impossibility of the physical process that is associated with that affirmation.

But perhaps it is impossible only in this world.  Perhaps there's a way to reconfigure neuron-like events so that, in another possible universe, another version of X1 and X2 could fire simultaneously.

If so, then P1*P2 is true in some possible worlds.

But if P1*P2 is not true in any possible worlds, then it seems that materialism is false.

(Must edit/kick around)

Comments

Post a Comment

Popular posts from this blog

P F Strawson's Freedom and Resentment: the argument laid out

Here is a summary and comments on the essay Freedom and Resentment by PF Strawson.  He makes some great points, and when he is wrong, it is in such a way as to clarify things a great deal.  My non-deterministic position is much better thanks to having read this.  I’ll summarize it in this post and respond in a later one. In a nutshell: PFS first argues that personal resentment that we may feel toward another for having failed to show goodwill toward us would have no problem coexisting with the conviction that determinism is true.  Moral disapprobation, as an analog to resentment, is likewise capable of coexisting with deterministic convictions. In fact, it would seem nearly impossible for a normally-constituted person (i.e., a non-sociopath) to leave behind the web of moral convictions, even if that person is a determinist.  In this way, by arguing that moral and determinist convictions can coexist in the same person, PFS undermines the libertarian argument ...
Post a Comment
Read more

Daniel Dennett, disqualifying qualia, softening up the hard problem, fullness of vacuity, dysfunctional functionalism

Around track 2 of disc 9 of Intuition Pumps , Dennett offers what I would call an argument from vacuity.  He argues that David Chalmers unwittingly plays a magic trick on himself and others by placing a set of issues under the one umbrella called the "hard problem of consciousness." None of these issues is really , in Dennett's opinion, a hard problem.  But in naming them thus, Chalmers (says Dennett) is like a magician who seems to be playing the same card trick over and over again, but is really playing several different ones.  In this analogy, expert magicians watch what they think is the same trick played over and over again.  They find it unusually difficult to determine which trick he is playing because they take these performances as iterations of the same trick when each is  in fact different from the one that came before.  Furthermore, each of the tricks that he plays is actually an easy one, so it is precisely because they are looki...
Post a Comment
Read more

naturalism (or rather, anti-supernaturalism) and preternaturalism

I will use the term "preternaturalism" to designate a willingness to posit causes that are less than divine but which stand above and beyond those observable ones we see operating within the laws of nature. A naturalist might oppose theistic arguments from miracles or design by arguing for the possibility of preternatural causes.  Such an argument, however, would bring us back to Zeus and Hera, tree nymphs and  the like: a supernatural explanation would, by contrast, be more conducive toward a scientific approach to nature (i.e., positing only laws that are falsifiable when doing science).
Post a Comment
Read more