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A "Copernican Revolution" revolution

Some view Copernicus' theory as the paradigmatic example of the replacement of the common sense understanding of nature with a science-based understanding.  They need to consider what really happened:  Copernicus gave a new, heliocentric description to the movement of the sun and planets across the sky;  later, Newton offered an explanation of that movement, replacing an Aristotelian/Ptolemaic understanding of the spheres with the Newtonian understanding of force and momentum.  Both the older and the newer description of the movement of these bodies presuppose the veracity of our perception, and both the older and the newer explanations of these movements presuppose the veracity of our common sense notion of causality (even Galilean relativity is a matter of common sense -- for anyone who has ridden in a vehicle).  Common sense is not utterly overturned by science: rather, common sense serves as the basis for explanation.  When there is a correction of one common sense interpretation, it is always on the basis of other common sense convictions, and it is always with the goal of discovering how reality itself, as accessed through both our common sense and scientific convictions, forms coherent whole.

Inseparable from our common sense convictions is our awareness of our own activity and passivity in the world.  Hence one who treats our common sense beliefs about ourselves as just another theory (i.e., as folk psychology) renders his own theory vacuous, for without a genuine acquaintance with our own causality we are left with no acquaintance with any causality at all.  One who supposes that so-called folk psychology can be replaced with another theory render his own philosophy of science incoherent.  He is climbing a ladder and then kicking it out from beneath himself.

Without human agency there is no scientist.  One cannot get rid of the scientist without getting rid of science itself.

Comments

Tim D said…
Good point. "The Copernican principle" in some contexts has come to mean that humanity is not noticeably different from anything else. Whereas the premise of science from the Renaissance onwards has been - there is a order behind the universe, mediated through the language of symbols we can understand.

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