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holism in sensation, i.e., the sensus communis as a kind of Umweltglaube

I haven't the time to write this down right now, but hopefully I'll remember what the insight was when I read the heading.

It has to do w what STAq said (in commentary on De sensu) re mere sensation as judgment (think Husserlian synthesis here).  This is the condition for the possibility of perception at the highest level (thinking of vis cogitativa/estimativa here)...

and it has to do with the fact that perception is never of just this or that form of this or that thing, but of the whole concrete environment in relation to the perceiver (to misquote Phillipians: "...as something to be grasped at.")  In other words, it has to do with holism vs. particularism, being strongly in in support of a view of perception as holistic...

and it has to do with Aristotle's mention somewhere in De anima that the unity of perceptual powers in the same subject makes possible our perception of the unity of perceptual objects in the same object thing...but it extends this point to welt unity (which is the condition for the possibility of the unity-in-perception of this or that item).

Add to this Alva Noe's regard for perception as a kind of subset of holistic interaction...

as well as with the fact that this perception is a precursor of intellection whereby one is directed (thinking here of Aristotle's "the soul is in a way all things') -- not to the environment -- but to the world...to the universe... to ens commune.  In other words, the umwelt glaube had in perception is the necessary condition for a kind of metaphysical weltwissen had intellectually and which the stage/theater/background (not sure which) upon which this or that think is regarded as displaying itself to us as we judge it.

This idea is a big deal but I'm too tired to go on right now.

()()()()()

Perhaps add discussion of network of it-cans and I-cans, ala Husserl.

Also, compare the human qua intelligent with the subhuman animal thus:
Just as a human is, in a way, all things, so too the animal is, in a way, its environment (inasmuch as it owns or possesses or apprehends it).

Also, this holism in our regard for perception is needed for our being able to see a kind of continuity between intellection and perception.

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