Skip to main content

desire, force, hierarchy

Imagine a much stronger person acting on one who is weaker an smaller.  The two compete with each other when it comes to displaying force.  That is, they counteract each other.  Also, one can note both forces using the same register.

Imagine a more knowledgeable person persuading one who less so to act a certain way (e.g., an architect giving plans to a bricklayer).  The one being directed displays desire, as does the director.  Neither display of desire negates the achievements of the other; rather, at least in certain scenarios, the achievements of each one magnify those of the other (the less knowledgeable is able to achieve more than he/she otherwise could and vise versa).  Also, note that one can recognize the two desires and their fulfillments only by using two different registers.  For example, think about an architect telling a bricklayer how to lay bricks by drawing a blueprint: the bricklayer registers whether he/she has laid bricks well by registering how they are placed with respect to each other, to other materials, and to their environment; the architect registers whether she/he has designed a house well by registering how the parts of the house such as rooms and the house as a whole relate to other parts, to humans and the physical environment.

My point: When we look at a hierarchy of powers, we often conceive of them as competing forces.  But what if they relate to each other more like the complementary desires given in the second example?  What if we can only note this relation by employing different registers?

Furthermore, isn't the objection the only non-dualistic alternative to reductionism is vitalism (and the assumption that this objection is fatal to non-reductivism) seen as cogent only because the objector conceives of the issue according to the first example, when thinking of it according to the second example would both more adequately represent the situation and undermine the objection?

Comments

Popular posts from this blog

Dembski's "specified compexity" semiotics and teleology (both ad intra and ad extra)

Integral to Dembski's idea of specified complexity (SC) is the notion that something extrinsic to evolution is the source of the specification in how it develops. He compares SC to the message sent by space aliens in the movie "Contact." In that movie, earthbound scientists determine that radio waves originating in from somewhere in our galaxy are actually a signal being sent by space aliens. The scientists determine that these waves are a signal is the fact that they indicate prime numbers in a way that a random occurrence would not. What is interesting to me is the fact that Dembski relies upon an analogy with a sign rather than a machine. Like a machine, signs are produced by an intelligent being for the sake of something beyond themselves. Machines, if you will, have a meaning. Signs, if you will, produce knowledge. But the meaning/knowledge is in both cases something other than the machine/sign itself. Both signs and machines are purposeful or teleological

continuing the discussion with Tim in a new post

Hi Tim, I am posting my reply here, because the great blogmeister won't let me put it all in a comment. Me thinks I get your point: is it that we can name and chimps can't, so therefore we are of greater value than chimps? Naming is something above and beyond what a chimp can do, right? In other words, you are illustrating the point I am making (if I catch your drift). My argument is only a sketch, but I think adding the ability to name names, as it were, is still not enough to make the argument seem cogent. For one can still ask why we prefer being able to name over other skills had by animals but not by humans. The objector would demand a more convincing reason. The answer I have in mind is, to put it briefly, that there is something infinite about human beings in comparison with the subhuman. That "something" has to do with our ability to think of the meaning of the cosmos. Whereas one might say"He's got the whole world in His han

particular/universal event/rule

While listening to a recorded lecture on Quine's Two Dogmas of Empiricism, it occurred to me that every rule is in a way, a fact about the world. Think about baseball: from the p.o.v. of an individual player, a baseball rule is not a thing but a guide for acting and interpreting the actions of others.  But this rule, like the action it guides, is part of a concrete individual --i.e., part of an institution that has come into existence at a particular place and time, has endured and  may eventually go out of existence.  The baseball rule, as a feature of that individual, is likewise individual.  The term "baseball rule," on the one hand, links us to a unique cultural event; it can, on the other hand, name a certain type of being.  In this way, it transgresses the boundary between proper and common noun. If there were no such overlap, then we might be tempted to divide our ontology between a bunch of facts "out there" and a bunch of common nouns "in here.&qu