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split brains and anti-metaphysicians

In hist lecture series, Exploring Metaphysics, David Johnson offers a brilliant examination of the alternatives to dualism that have been offered by 20th century analytic philosophers.  The only problem is the way he ignores sizable chunks of the history of philosophy.  It is as if Plato said a little bit about the immateriality of the soul, then nothing else interesting or important was said for about 1900 years until Descartes cam around.  Then Descartes developed an easily refutable theory called "dualism," which is easily refuted.  Philosophy, for Johnson, is essentially the search for an alternative to Descartes.

A big clue to Johnson's approach is the first example he gives in the first lecture:  he has us consider how someone who has a split brain (i.e., their corpus callossum has been divided) acts like two people acting in one body.  One side acts like a five year old and tries to do things contrary to the wishes of the other.  This example proves to DJ that we are not unified beings.  He doesn't offer a philosophical explanation for the fact that most of the time our consciousness is unified.  No, that's not quite interesting enough to bring up.  Instead, he starts his lecture series with an exceptional case, which he uses as a basis for for his speculations.

In that same first lecture, DJ spent less than a minute acknowledging that Plato had some interesting things to say before he turned to Cartesian dualism, which he ten proceeded to rebut.  I've no problem with someone criticizing DC, but throughout the course DJ seems to assume that  philosophy began with Descartes.  After proposing DC's dualism as his straw man, DJ then considers the various alterantives.  But at no point does he go to preCartesian thinkers as resources.  In fact, he doesn't mention anyone who came after Descartes as well.  He just uses 20th century analytic reasoning while being dreadfully ignorant of the rest of the history of philosophy.

Here's a somewhat silly explanation to what goes on in these split brain patients (in the past, it was the only way to stop brain seizures in those suffering from epilepsy): maybe the part that acts like a five-year old is not conscious but acting out in zombie-like fashion.  Just as neurons in our guts guide digestion, so to perhaps neurons on one side of the brain can guide actions without consciousness.  Should some medical advance make it possible to reconnect the corpus callossum, the misbehaving side will be reappropriated into the whole...

Crazier still: imagine John Searle's Chinese room argument but this time with a two-man crew, one of whom has thrown away the rule book...

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