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Truth and community

These are very, very rough ideas that I am throwing out for future rumination...

One element in the experience had by one who (seriously) claims that their claim is true is the expectation and hope that others will see that it is true.  If the basis for this hope is lacking, then there is at least the thought that if there were others who could have seen the way things are, then they would have seen that it is true.   We may even attest to the truth under presently hopeless circumstances with the hope that some day others will see the truth of one's claim.  We witness to the truth on the basis of our hope that the broader community of rational beings will recognize the veracity of our claim.  In a sense, even when, practically speaking, there is not hope that one's words will be heard by those who can understand, we may attest to the truth as an expression of a kind of solidarity with the broader rational community, which extends beyond one's possible experience (knowing the truth of mathematics or logic as omni-temporally true involves such solidarity).  Perhaps those who seek the truth in a manner that seems to disregard what others would think and who seem to be acting just for themselves have the last sort of solidarity in mind

I remember that the fact that one can't separate one's notion of truth from community helped solve an important philosophical problem.  But I can't remember what philosophical problem it was supposed to solve.  Durn!  In any case, it's worth thinking about...


Also, moral goodness may involves an analogous hope relating oneself to the community of beings who act for the rational good (or somethin' like that) as well as an actual trans-experiential solidarity with such a community.  There are interesting details to be explored there.

Maybe I can fit claims regarding beauty into this scheme as well.  Hmmm.  Do I really expect others to think something is beautiful if they are reasonable and I am to in my estimation of beauty?  Is evolution, for example, beautiful?  (I think it is.)  Would it be beautiful to other rational creatures who evolved differently that we did?  If there were rational crows, would they think carrion beautiful?  Hmmmn.

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