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Indexicals and the first-person perspective in scientific reports as supporting an anti-reductionist view of science

This is a very rough draft of some ideas I'm kicking around:

Scientific reports are either given in the first person or at least presuppose a first person report.
That is evidenced by the necessity of using indexicals  to give reports.   Indexicals include "this," "that," "here," "there," "now," "yesterday," "thereupon," etc.
The use of indexicals involves a first person perspective because they situate what is being reported in relation to the individual giving the report.

The practice of giving scientific reports begins in the first person.  That is, science as social practice begins only after someone says, "I did this, then that happened."

Eventually, reports can be given in the third person passive voice.  "This was added to that; such and such was observed."  But this is just a way of giving a first person report while leaving the reporter anonymous.  It is parasitic upon the first person perspective.

The following simple thought experiment can perhaps demonstrate that parasitism: two different scientists, upon separately publishing mutually inconsistent findings, written in the third person, will find it necessary to argue either with each other or with readers about whose report is accurate.  In defending the veracity of their reports, each of them will inevitably say things like, "Well, I did it this way, then I observed that... previously, I had combined...etc."  "I really did combine those two things: I'm not making it up."  If, when trying to establish the accuracy of their scientific reports, they insist on giving third-person accounts of what was done by an anonymous someone, they will be asked: how do you know that it was done this way?  Who did it?  Did he report to you?  Did he give you a first person report, or did he merely tell you that X was done by another, anonymous someone?"

Hmmmm: I smell an infinite regress problem that can only be solved by giving a certain primacy to first person reports.  Any scientific report, therefore, ultimately requires the taking of a stand by someone speaking in the first person about what was experienced.  The first person report is a personal commitment, of sorts.  A way of all-but-saying "Trust me," "I am putting my reputation on the line," etc.

For all these reasons, there is something anti-reductive about scientific reporting (the possibility of which must be presupposed by those who quite reasonably give credence to science's conclusions), for in saying that they previously did this, observed that, etc, reporters presuppose their own identity through time.  They take for granted that the reporter, observer, and doer are one.

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