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Chinese Auditorium;

In one of his books (I think it was Intuition Pumps) Daniel Dennett attempts to reply to Searle's Chinese Room Argument, saying that the man in the Chinese Room isn't really equivalent to a computer.  That is because a computer involves both higher-level language ("natural language"?) and lower level language (uh, I forget his name for this), whereas the man in the Chinese Room uses only the higher.

Two responses come to mind that show the weakness of Dennett's reply.

First of all, what if instead of making a Chinese Room with one operator, we constructed a large auditorium with many operators, each of whom was responsible for executing a part of the lower level language.  If you like, you can add operators executing the higher-level language as well. Wouldn't this Chinese Auditorium defeat Dennett's desperate objection to the Chines Room Argument?  That is, wouldn't the Chinese Auditorium serve as an effective counterexample to the claim that computers, inasmuch as they combine higher and lower level languages, can think?

Another response might be that we need not construct a whole auditorium, for the bodily functions of the solitary man in the Chinese room can be conceived of as executing one or even many lower-level program(s), all at the same time; hence the man in the original Chinese Room Argument is already doing what Dennett says it must do.

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