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dilemma for materialists who believe we can know about necessity in nature.

For a materialist who believes that we can know about necessity in nature, the following question occurs:

Assuming for the moment that the materialist is correct in saying that all physical processes, including cognitive ones, occur necessarily, then the nature of our knowledge of that necessity becomes interesting.  That is, it's worth asking how the necessity characterizing the physical processes constituting the knowledge are related to the necessity characterizing the process in nature that is one's object of knowledge.  We might ask the following:  does the the latter cause or determine the former?

If the answer is no, then where does our knowledge of necessity come from?

If the answer is yes, then wouldn't every cognition be recognition of such necessity? After all, every cognitive process is, for a materialist, a necessary one.  In such a case, the fact that some truths seem to be of contingent matters would be an embarrassing counterexample.

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