The efficient cause par excellence: or there's no escaping anthropocentrism, but that's a good thing
The efficient cause par excellence is a human agent acting deliberately and skillfully (I am speaking epistemically not ontologically: i.e., the prime example by which understand all other cases).
"Lower level" causes must be understood by subtracting attirbutes from the human prime analog. For example, "force" involves an analogy with the kinaesthesis involved in intentional acts. Ditto with energy.
A little fuzzy here: If our understanding of "lower level" causes were not arrived at in the manner just proposed, then you certainly could not explain human action (trying to move, wishing, perceiving, judging, etc.) by adding together the lower level actions... or at least not without sweeping the problem under the carpet by using homuncular descriptive language.
A mechanism does not cognize, desire, try to act.
"Lower level" causes must be understood by subtracting attirbutes from the human prime analog. For example, "force" involves an analogy with the kinaesthesis involved in intentional acts. Ditto with energy.
A little fuzzy here: If our understanding of "lower level" causes were not arrived at in the manner just proposed, then you certainly could not explain human action (trying to move, wishing, perceiving, judging, etc.) by adding together the lower level actions... or at least not without sweeping the problem under the carpet by using homuncular descriptive language.
A mechanism does not cognize, desire, try to act.
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