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Friendly discussion re intelligent design w/ other prof

The following is a pair of letters and replies between me and a professor who has criticized intelligent design as being "operationally vacuous," i.e., not even having the possibility of a research program.

Hello Dr. G

I am an adjunct professor at St. Mary's Seminary in Baltimore and am presently enjoying your ... lectures ... on [s]cience...

It occurred to me that intelligent design need not be operationally vacuous: suppose three researchers look at the same phenomena with three different agendas. The first believes that the neo-Darwinian understanding of evolution is sufficient to explain the origin of present life forms; the second believes that evolution could not have occurred unless extra-terrestrials intervened; the third is Michael Behe. It seems conceivable to me that the three could engage in research that might support each of their respective theses. The evidence for ET (#2) would be first of all the improbability that things evolved as they did without intervention, and secondly, evidence of such an intervention. The evidence for ID would be the same improbability, coupled with the lack of evidence of such an intervention precisely where there should be such evidence. I guess "lack of evidence" of #2 isn't very strong, but I imagine that there are other theses that at present lack such evidence (dark matter).
Just my meanderings... hope you enjoyed.
Sincerely,
Leo White

**********************

Dear Prof. White,
I apologize for the delay in replying to your email, in part (but
only in part!) because I've thought about your suggestion. I certainly
agree that IF a researcher has an experimental research program keyed
to confirming or disconfirming a hypothesis, then the hypothesis is a
candidate for being a scientific hypothesis (assuming consistency with
prevailing assumptions such as no perpetual motion, conservation of
mass-energy, usw). So your ET case would qualify if it meant searching
for a determinate isotope ratio in archaebacteria, say, that is agreed
to be of extra-terrestrial origin, analogous to the iridium anomaly
that Alvarez based is dinosaur extinction hypothesis on. But note that
that only pushes back the question of the origin of life to the origin
of the ET life form that influenced the formation of life on Earth.
Barring infinite regress, eiher the u-life form arose spontaneously or
you have to invoke a supra-natural cause/being, and then you're
outside science!
OK, for the ET case. Can you think of a test of ID along the same
lines? So far, Behe hasn't, or I'm sure he would announce it or let me
know. And of course, he's stuck with the regress as well, and the
violation of the assumption that nature is a closed system.

*****************************

Dear Professor G,
I was delighted to hear back from you! It took me quite a while even to see your reply, as it landed in my inbox while my family was two-week vacation. After that, I needed some time to mull over what you had said and then find the opportunity to write. Here is the fruit of all that, which I hope you’ll find interesting.
First I’ll paraphrase one of the important points you make in your email as a dilemma: at the end of the day, the one must argue that the genesis of life is either a natural or a miraculous event. If the former suffices then the ultimate goal of ID has not been achieved. If the latter, then ID is not science, for science assumes that nature is a closed system.
I think that you offer a good argument, but I would like to go in a different direction before addressing it.
Behe’s argument, as far as I can tell, is not about the origin of all life but about its development. He argues that, given the conventional understanding of evolution’s mechanism and the amount of time available, the development of the present forms of life is highly improbable. So far, this is not an unscientific objection, regardless of whether his arguments in support of it are convincing.
Add to the above the claim that only an intelligent designer of some sort would suffice to bring about evolution as it has occurred. This is not an unscientific claim either. As you grant in your response to my first email, a scientist who suspected that extra terrestrials supply what is needed for earthly evolution needed could look for evidence of their presence. The same scientist might assume that this ET, unlike earthlings, belongs to a species that has had an adequate amount of time to evolve. So he or she would see no reason to suppose that any divine intervention was involved.
It seems to me that a proponent of ID would engage in the same sort of research as would proponents of ET, with the only difference being that the former would hope to find no trace of an extra-terrestrial while the latter would hope to find such a trace. So there is at least the possibility of a research program for ID, but it might well be no better justified than a research program for ET.
Suppose the search for ET is justified but unsuccessful. At this point, a dilemma would kick in, one similar to the one presented at the beginning of this email: one could reasonably infer that evolution is the result of either some still unrecognized natural cause or a supernatural intervention. One could not, however, (solely on the basis of scientific reasoning) exclude the former alternative or propose the latter. In this way, ID (inasmuch as it is a scientific theory) cannot so much prove its central thesis (that God guided evolution through supernatural means) as it can exclude its naturalistic explanations in a somewhat Popperian fashion.
One objection to the above might be that the assumption that nature is a closed system requires one to assume that there must be a natural cause of the way things have evolved. I would respond that term “closed system” can be applied in two ways: methodologically and ontologically.
The former uses the term "closed system" to describe the discipline that studies nature rather than to describe nature itself. It requires that we seek only natural causes when doing science but does not insist that only natural causes exist. In this way it allows for the possibility that there might be some events that natural science cannot explain. It also allows for the possibility that there is a different kind of reasoning (i.e., natural theology) about the same subject matter, one that leads to inferences about God. That is, perhaps a natural theologian can take arguments about intelligent design further than ID can. One who takes arguments in this direction, however, is not doing scientific reasoning--but that is not to say that natural theology is any less rational.
The other use of the term “closed system” is to say that we must assume that nature itself is closed, i.e., that only natural causes exist. Certainly, given such an assumption, no inferences about God’s involvement in the world could be reasonable. But then again, it is just an assumption, and an unnecessary one at that. For we can avoid confusing science with natural theology and/or faith simply by using the term “closed system” methodologically, i.e., to refer to how we inquire about nature rather than to nature itself.
I believe that ID, inasmuch as it claims to be scientific, can carry its argument only so far in virtue of the way in which scientific reasoning is a closed system. But I do not thereby deny the possibility that another discipline might be able to carry the argument farther.
Let me admit that I really don’t have a firm opinion about ID. I do think at best it has inherent limitations, and that there are other, better approaches to talking about God. Your lectures and your reply provoked me to try to work out where I stand on this issue. I hope you enjoyed it; if you have more to say, I’d be grateful to hear it while promising you not to burden you with a long a response the next time(s) you reply.
Peace,


*****************************
Very interesting and cogently presented. Closedness is indeed an
assumption, not a "fact". Searching for the causes of very low
probability events poses a challenge for scientists, in
cosmology/cosmogony no less than in biology. Thus, recourse to the
anthropic principle, which seems close to ID as a classical "cop out".
I want to think some more about this.
Thanks, again,
S G

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