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Summary of Behe

The following is a selection of interesting points in Behe's Edge of Evolution:
The main planks of his understanding of the controversey are
1.) a complete acceptance of descent with modification,
but combined with
2.) a rejection of the sufficiency of natural selection/random variation to explain that modification;
3.) a fine tuning hypothesis to account for radically improbable mutations (this fine tuning is a kind of extension of the anthropic principle to biology).

The most helpful argument was in chapter 7, where he said that
1.) the formation of new macromolecular structures in the cell would require two or more protein molecues to become joined through modifications in the amino acids of their respective binding sights;
2). the mutations to these binding sights must result in their being complementary with respect to shape and chemical properties,
3). such complementarity is extremely improbable-- about one in ten to a hundred million.
4). such complementarity must occur in the same individual in order for the mutation to be beneficial rather than neutral/harmful
5). the rate of mutation itself is one in a hundred thousand.
6). The amount of time needed for such a mutation would be greater than the age of the earth
7). An analogous argument regarding the (modular) development of new structures in animals: this argument works in an analogous manner to the one re the development of new intra-cellular structures.

Interesting: he treats malaria's failure to build new machinery as the Michaelson-Morely experiment of Darwinism (when he uses "Darwinism" he means the claim that random variation suffices to come up with the needed new structures).

Also interesting: he argues mechanistically.

Behe plus my response: ID predicts that random mutation is not sufficient to account for genesis of complex machinery. Reply: this shows that there is a research program for ID, one that involves probability, retrodiction.

Behe: ID is consistent with fine tuning an no intervention. Reply: yes, and the version you propose, therefore, is consistent with deism too.

Behe: Darwin denied that one should explain origin via planning. Reply: was this denial methodological or ontological?

Behe: we can reasonably infer intelligent source of apparent design in nature. Reply: this may be reasonable, but this use of reason may be outside of the scope of science... it may be philosophical (but then again, everything is philosophical..) or it may be a hypbird of the psychological (or whatever discipline that could infer human intelligence as a cause of observed phenomena) and philosophical.

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